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Abstract
The Risk Protection Order: Protection from Mass Homicide? Brooke V. Elvington, 2022.
Applied Dissertation, Nova Southeastern University, Abraham S. Fischler College of
Education and School of Criminal Justice. Keywords: Red Flag Law, risk protection law,
mass homicide offender typology, gun control.
Gun control measures, referred to as “risk protection orders” or “Red Flag” laws, are
expanding with widespread public support. Currently, 19 states have similar legislation,
varying in procedural approaches and enforcement to reduce firearm-related homicide,
emphasizing mass homicide. However, little is known about whether the legislation is
effective.
The following questions are presented: (1) Is there a difference between rates of firearmrelated homicide incidences prior to and after the creation of Florida’s “Red Flag” law?
(2) Do risk protection orders target individuals demonstrating known mass homicide
offender typology characteristics? The study used data derived from open-source
resources. An interrupted time-series analysis was conducted to evaluate the effect of the
intervention on firearm-related homicides. Data for firearms-related-homicides were
obtained from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement from 1999 to 2020, while
suicide data were obtained from the Bureau of Vital Statistics. The study revealed that
rates of firearm-related homicides statistically significantly increased after implementing
the legislation, p=.003, adj.R2=47.7%, F(3,18)=6.889. Firearm-related suicide rates, on
the contrary, decreased significantly after intervention, p<.001, adj.R2=65.3%,
F(3,18)=14.169.
Data of risk protection petitions (N =556) filed from March 2018 to March 2019 were
collected from Pinellas, Broward, and Seminole counties. Bivariate analysis using a chisquare test for association showed that statements involving intent to commit mass
homicide (N=76) was negatively correlated with only one statutory variable, unlawful or
reckless display of a firearm, but positively correlated with three of the added variables:
(1) evidence of suicidal ideation; (2) evidence of planned revenge; and (3) evidence of
precipitating factors, including strain. The fourth added variable, domestic violence,
negatively correlates with the outcome.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Nature of the Research Problem
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines “mass homicide” as offenses
involving four or more murders committed with no cooling off period (FBI, 2008).
Although mass shooting incidences remain rare compared to the overall firearm-related
homicide rate, shootings influence a wide range of public policy related to school safety
procedures and gun control initiatives as a result of widespread media attention (Agnich,
2015). In the past few years alone, nineteen states adopted legislation designed to remove
firearms and prohibit firearm purchases from individuals deemed to pose safety risks to
themselves or others (Blocher & Charles, 2020). The gun control measures, often referred
to as “Red Flag” laws, are designed to prevent firearm-related homicides by offering a
judicial mechanism to confiscate firearms or prohibit possession of firearms from
individuals who are believed to be a threat to themselves or others. States vary in
procedures and enforcement, and little research is available to determine its efficacy.
There is little empirical research available to determine whether gun control measures
effectively reduce firearm-related incidences (Campbell & Yablon, 2018; Zeoli et al.,
2021).
There is an unquestionable expansion of risk protection legislation throughout the
United States, and there is widespread public support for the gun control measures (APM,
2019; Campbell & Yablon, 2018). Despite widespread public support for the legislation,
critics argue that the legislation is not only ineffective but also creates constitutional
concerns and issues surrounding social justice (Campbell & Yablon, 2018; Swanson,
2020). In Florida, the procedure utilized for the entry of risk protection orders
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necessitates significant public resources involving the use of law enforcement and the
judiciary. In addition, there are collateral consequences to the imposition of the risk
protection order, which are not limited to a person’s ability to possess a firearm. In
Florida, there are criminal consequences to violating an order, which authorizes law
enforcement to secure a search warrant (Risk Protection Orders, 2018). Despite lacking
any evidence of criminal involvement, the entry of the risk protection order provides law
enforcement a clear mechanism to engage with citizens on a confrontational basis. From
a social policy perspective, the legislation is too new to evaluate widespread collateral
consequences. However, researchers question whether risk protection orders raise
significant social justice concerns (Swanson, 2020).
This study investigates the efficacy of the recently enacted “Red Flag” law in
Florida, referred to as “Risk Protection Orders” (Risk Protection Orders, 2018). Florida’s
gun control measure was enacted in response to the Parkland mass school shooting. There
are no known studies to evaluate the differences in firearm homicide or suicide rates prior
to and after legislative implementation. Likewise, no known studies analyze data
collected in reference to Florida’s Risk Protection Orders to determine whether the
individuals subjected to firearm removal share similar characteristics to mass homicide
offenders. Lacking substantive review and evaluation, the efficacy of Florida’s Risk
Protection Orders is unknown, thereby placing the public at risk and obscuring the need
for legislative attention/reform. This study constitutes Florida’s first known analysis of
the 2018 legislation designed to evaluate efficacy related to firearm-related homicide
rates.

3
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the study is to investigate whether the recently enacted “Red Flag”
laws in Florida, referred to as “Risk Protection Orders,” effectively reduce firearmrelated homicides and whether possible mass homicide offenders are targeted. There is
little data available nationwide on the effectiveness of risk protection orders, and the
available data involves small sample sizes. In addition, it is difficult to generalize the
results of a study from one state because states vary in both procedural mechanisms and
enforcement.
The first research question in the study evaluates gun-related homicide and
suicide rates prior to and after the enactment of the legislation. The researcher compiled
data from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement’s Uniform Crime Reports and the
Bureau of Vital Statistics from 1999 to 2020 to compare the incidences prior to and after
the 2018 legislative implementation. An independent t-test was utilized to compare
means, and linear regression was used to conduct an interrupted time series analysis.
The second research question addresses whether the targets of the Risk Protection
Orders demonstrate mass homicide offender typology. If the measure does not identify
high-risk offenders, relying on risk protection legislation as a preventative measure may
not be effective at reducing mass homicide incidences. While there is no universally
accepted typology for mass homicide offenders, decades of research have determined the
presence of several key variables: (1) express statements involving an intent to commit
mass homicide; (2) the desire for revenge; (3) evidence of significant planning versus
impulsive conduct; and (4) evidence of precipitating events causing strain (Dutton, White
& Fogarty, 2013; Fox & Levin, 1998; Levin & Madfis, 2009; Taylor, 2018). In addition,
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the researcher included domestic violence and suicide as variables because both are
associated with mass homicide (Duwe, 2013; Fridel, 2021). Part II of the study evaluates
the filed petitions to determine the prevalence of identified risk factors by conducting a
2x2 Chi-square test for association (see Appendix).
Background and Significance
The Center for Disease Control, (CDC), reports that in 2017 39,773 people died
from firearm-related injuries in the United States (Pew Research Center, 2019). Most
firearm-related deaths are from suicide, and 37% are classified as murder (Pew Research
Center, 2019). The CDC does not report a mass homicide incident rate. However,
according to the Web-based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System (WISQARS),
the 2017 incident rate for incidents involving more than two victims was 781,
representing a small statistical percentage of overall firearm-related homicide rates
(WISQARS, 2018). The CDC maintains data in its National Violent Death Reporting
System (NVDRS) on multi-victim homicides. However, not all states currently
participate in exchanging data, and Florida does not currently do so (NVDRS, 2022). The
underlying premise of the Red Flag Legislation is that if access is reduced, the incidences
will likewise be reduced. Thus, the legislation's goal is to prevent crime and establish
social order. Proponents of the legislation would highlight the high lethality rate in
modern mass shooting incidences and the ineffectiveness of traditional law enforcement
methods in preventing the offenses Opponents of the legislation would challenge the
effectiveness of gun control, particularly when compared to mass shooter typology
(Duwe, 2013, 2017). In addition, opponents would emphasize that the method of
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establishing order involves the restriction of the individual’s right to possess firearms
regardless of whether the individual committed a criminal act.
A study conducted in 2013 by Duwe evaluated homicides occurring between
1900 and 1999 and found that although homicides tend to occur at a rate of 20,000 per
year, mass homicides constitute approximately 27 incidents per year (Duwe, 2013). Data
compiled from newspaper articles and the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports, SHR,
indicate that there were 909 incidents of mass homicide with 1,186 offenders during this
time frame (Duwe, 2013). Thus, when compared to homicide in general, mass homicide
accounts for 0.1% of all incidences (Duwe, 2013).
Notably, although the overall incidence rate is low compared to firearm-related
incidences in general, mass shooting incidences have been increasing at much greater
rates since the 1980s than in prior decades (Duwe, 2013). The FBI released a study in
2013 limited to mass shooting incidences and identified 160 incidences from 2000 to
2013 with 486 deaths (FBI, 2013). A more recent analysis compiled by USA Today
established that there were 317 mass homicide incidences between 2006 and 2016, with
355 offenders and 1,600 victims (Fox et al., 2018).
Despite the statistical rarity of public mass shooting incidences, the lethality rate
associated with individual offenses is increasing (Duwe, 2017). In fact, since 2012, we
have seen a historical high in the average victim rate (Duwe, 2017). The startling nature
of public mass shooting incidences, along with the high lethality rate, create fear and
outrage, and often lead to gun control initiatives. President Obama’s 2013 plan to reduce
gun violence was prompted by the Sandy Hook Elementary School massacre in 2012
(Fan, 2015). The Sandy Hook shooter, Adam Lanza, then age twenty, executed his
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mother in his home by firing four shots to her head (Fan, 2015). Armed with a
Bushmaster rifle, Glock 20 10-mm pistol, Sig Sauer 9-mm pistol, and a significant
amount of ammunition, Lanza then shot his way through the glass doors of Sandy Hook
Elementary School and murdered twenty children and six adults (Fan, 2015). The
massacre lasted approximately eleven minutes and ended with Lanza’s suicide (Fan,
2015). In response, President Obama announced a three-part plan related to (1) improved
background checks, (2) a prohibition against military-style weapons and high-capacity
ammunition magazines, and (3) increased penalties for illegal firearm trafficking (Fan,
2015).
Six years after the Sandy Hook massacre, on Valentine’s Day 2018, Nicolas Cruz
entered Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida and within six
minutes of entry, murdered seventeen people, including fourteen children (Brezenski,
2018). Cruz was armed with an AR-15 firearm capable of discharging 30 rounds in less
than one minute (Brezenski, 2018). Like Adam Lanza, there are reports that Nicolas Cruz
was mentally ill or unstable prior to the attack (Brezenski, 2018). Within six days after
the massacre, high school students who survived the attack approached state legislatures
and demanded gun reform (Brezenski, 2018). Regardless of whether empirical data
establish a positive correlation between gun control laws and mass homicide incidences,
research conducted in 2013 establishes that the majority of Americans support gun
control laws, particularly those that place emphasis on mental health (Barry, McGinty,
Vernick & Webster, 2013). Ultimately, the survivors effectively spearheaded Florida’s
“Red Flag” law (Risk Protection Orders, 2018).
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Risk Protection Orders
Florida’s recent “Red Flag” law permits the state to confiscate firearms from
individuals who pose a significant danger to others regardless of whether the person
committed any criminal act (Risk Protection Orders, 2018). Specifically, the statute
permits law enforcement to obtain a court order to prevent firearm access to those
individuals who pose a significant danger because of a “mental health crisis” or violent
behavior (Risk Protection Orders, 2018).
To initiate the procedure in Florida, a member of law enforcement must file a
petition seeking a Risk Protection Order in a circuit court (Risk Protection Orders, 2018).
Unlike other jurisdictions, family members or other concerned individuals are not
permitted to file a petition (Zeoli et al., 2021). Of course, there is nothing to prevent
family members from contacting law enforcement to initiate the process, and there is no
indication on the petition itself as to how law enforcement became involved (Risk
Protection Orders, 2018). The petition identifies the respondent’s demographic
information and then briefly identifies the legal basis for the petition. Under Florida law,
the petitioner must allege that the respondent poses a significant danger of causing
personal injury to themselves or others by having a firearm or ammunition in the near
future (Risk Protection Orders, 2018). Imminence is a requirement, and as such, the law
enforcement officer must provide an affidavit alleging specific facts that give rise to the
reasonable fear of significant dangerous acts (Risk Protection Orders, 2018). The petition
utilizes a 15-item checklist for the law enforcement officer to identify relevant evidence
for the court’s consideration as follows:
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1. Respondent involved in a recent act or threat of violence against themselves or
others;
2. Engaged in an act or threat of violence, including but not limited to acts or
threats of violence against themselves, within the past 12 months;
3. May be seriously mentally ill or may have recurring mental health issues;
4. Has violated a risk protection order or no contact order;
5. Is the subject of a previous or existing risk protection order;
6. Has been convicted of, had adjudication withheld on, or pled nolo contendere
in Florida or in any other state to a crime that constitutes an act of “domestic
violence”;
7. Has used, or threatened to use, against themselves or others, any weapons;
8. Has unlawfully or recklessly used, displayed, or brandished a firearm;
9. Has used, or threatened to use on a recurring basis, physical force against
another person or has stalked another person;
10. Has been arrested for, convicted of, had adjudication withheld, or pled nolo
contendere to a crime involving violence or a threat of violence in Florida or
in any other state;
11. Has abused or is abusing controlled substances or alcohol;
12. Has recently acquired firearms or ammunition;
13. Is required to possess firearms or ammunition in the scope and duties of their
occupation;
14. Has been the subject of proceedings under the Baker Act or Marchman Act;
and
15. Other (Risk Protection Orders, 2018; see Appendix).
Within 14 days of the petition being filed, the respondent is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing, and the petitioner bears the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that the respondent poses a significant threat (Risk Protection
Orders, 2018). If the petitioner meets its burden, the court will enter a risk protection
order preventing firearm possession for up to 12 months. The respondent may file one
motion during the 12 months period to vacate the order. However, the respondent then
bears the burden to establish clear and convincing evidence that the order should be
vacated (Risk Protection Orders, 2018). At the 12-month expiration, the petitioner may
file yet another petition to continue the risk protection order, and at that time, another
hearing would commence (Risk Protection Orders, 2018).
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The order’s violation constitutes a first-degree misdemeanor punishable by a term
not to exceed one year in county jail (Risk Protection Orders, 2018). Studies conducted in
Indiana raise concerns that criminal consequences of risk protection orders are not
isolated to a violation of the order (Swanson, Easter, Alanis-Hirsch, Belden, Norko,
Robertson, Frisman, Lin, Swartz & Parker, 2019). Researchers in Indiana found that one
in every five respondents was arrested during the initial firearm seizure or the 12 months
following the issuance of the order. Approximately 17% of arrests involved firearm
offenses (Swanson et al., 2019; Swanson, 2020).
Florida is not alone in enacting legislation that would effectively eliminate an
individual’s right to possess a firearm prior to that individual actually committing a
criminal offense. There are currently nineteen states that have enacted “Red Flag” laws,
including Connecticut, Indiana, California, Washington, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Maryland, and Florida (Broom, 2018; Cambell & Yablon, 2020; Gaudiano, 2018). The
procedures and the required burden of proof vary between the states. However, the
common goal of all of the “Red Flag” laws is to remove firearms from individuals
perceived to be a threat to themselves or others. In 2017, Vermont enacted similar
legislation targeting individuals who pose an “extreme risk” to themselves or others.
However, Vermont limited the petitioners to State Attorneys or the Office of the Attorney
General (Petition For Extreme Risk Protection Order, 2017). Rhode Island’s 2018 “Red
Flag” law requires law enforcement to initiate the petition. However, in addition to the
petition, the officer must attach an affidavit in support of a search warrant to permit the
officer to search the individual’s premises (Extreme Risk Protection Orders, 2018).
Similar to other “Red Flag” laws, the Rhode Island statute outlines specific factors that
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the court must consider, including the following: (1) a recent act or threat of violence, (2)
a pattern of acts or threats within 12 months, (3) the respondent’s mental health history,
(4) respondent’s abuse of controlled substances, (5) previous violations of restraining
orders, and (6) respondent’s criminal history (Extreme Risk Protection, 2018). Many
other states, including New York and Maine, are developing “Red Flag” laws similar to
Florida, Vermont, and Rhode Island (Miller, 2018; Vielkind, 2018).
Maryland enacted its “Red Flag” law on October 1, 2018, and 172 petitions have
been filed since that date (Broom, 2018). Unlike Florida, Vermont, and Rhode Island, the
petitioner in Maryland is not limited to law enforcement or State attorneys; rather,
petitions may be filed by family members, domestic partners, teachers, therapists, or law
enforcement (MD Public Safety §5-601, 2018). Of the 172 petitions, 24 cases were
denied or dismissed (Broom, 2018).
Oregon enacted its legislation in 2018 (Zeoli et al., 2021). Unlike Florida, a large
number of individuals in Oregon may constitute the “petitioner” for purposes of obtaining
a risk protection order. These individuals include family members, intimate partners, or
any person living in the same household (Zeoli et al., 2021). Critics of Oregon’s
legislation argue that permitting third parties to file petitions seeking firearm removal
raises a large number of concerns regarding the possibility of abuse or misuse (Zeoli et
al., 2021). The State of Oregon issued only 119 risk protection orders within 15 months
from the date of legislation enactment (Zeoli et al., 2021). In comparison, Florida courts
ordered more than 450 people to surrender firearms to a risk protection order within one
month of legislation enactment (LaGrone & Apthorp, 2018). Within the first year of
Florida’s “Red Flag” legislation, 2,654 risk protection orders were entered (Carlton,
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2019). Notably, the vast majority of the individuals had mental health history and were
considered a danger to themselves and not others (LaGrone & Apthorp, 2018).
In practice, “Red Flag” procedures resemble a civil injunction hearing. All states
have civil procedures permitting petitioners to seek protection from domestic violence or
stalking. If an individual is threatened by a household member, that individual may file a
civil protection petition, and if that petition is granted, the respondent must not contact
the petitioner. However, to obtain a protective order, the petitioner must establish that the
respondent committed an act akin to a criminal offense. In Florida, for instance, to obtain
an order of protection from domestic violence, the petitioner must establish that the
respondent committed an act of domestic violence or that he/she is in imminent fear that
an act of domestic violence will occur (Risk Protection Order, 2018). The definition of
“domestic violence” relates directly to the commission of criminal offenses (Domestic
Violence, 2018). Unlike domestic violence protection orders, there is no requirement that
the petitioner establishes that the respondent committed any criminal act pursuant to the
“Red Flag” laws. It is critical to note that criminal acts are defined by statute, and as such,
the conduct in question is clear. However, if the criteria relate to “dangerous” or
“threatening” conduct, there is considerable room for interpretation and likewise room for
abuse. Individuals subjected to Florida risk protection orders have attempted to challenge
the constitutionality of the statute on the basis that the statutory terminology is inherently
vague. However, Florida appellate courts rejected such an argument and upheld the
legislation (Davis v. Gilchrist County Sheriff’s Office, 2019).
In the context of “Red Flag” laws, there is no requirement that the individual is a
convicted felon, and there is no requirement that the individual has actually committed
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any act constituting a crime. Because it is not necessary to prove criminal conduct, the
procedure is similar to a preemptive strike where the government assumes that an
individual may constitute a threat, and as such, the government takes affirmative steps to
prevent that individual from carrying out the threat.
Gun control measures similar to Florida’s “Red Flag” law are gaining traction
throughout the United States with seemingly broad public approval. Jurisdictions
enforcing “Red Flag” laws are devoting public resources, including law enforcement and
the judiciary. From a public policy perspective, it is imperative that research is conducted
to determine whether this type of legislation is effective at reducing overall firearmrelated homicides and whether it is an effective tool to reduce mass homicide incidents.
Barriers and Issues
An obvious barrier to the study relates to the availability of data. Although all
petitions are available to any member of the public as a result of Florida’s public records
law, the sheer volume of petitions filed throughout the State of Florida limits the ability
to analyze every filed petition (Public Records, 2021). Thus, it was necessary to limit the
analysis to specific counties for this study. Likewise, the availability of specific
information related to the independent variables was an issue. The petitions are filed by
members of law enforcement, and the type of information that is included or omitted is
discretionary. As such, this study is inherently limited by the nature of the information
contained in the petitions. It would be important to note that additional factors relevant to
the findings in this study may have been present but omitted.
A second issue relates to the analysis of offender typology. There is no accepted
typology for mass homicide offenders, and there is considerable debate regarding how
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mass homicide offenders should be classified. For this study, the researcher included
commonly accepted variables in addressing typology. However, any attempt to
characterize mass homicide offenders must be accepted with limitations.
A third issue relates to the existence of a large number of confounding variables
that cannot be controlled in the context of comparing homicide rates prior to and after the
enactment of legislation. Even if gun control legislation has an apparent link to the
reduction (or increase) in homicide rates, one must accept the existence of a number of
variables that could contribute to the overall reduction. For instance, this study includes a
time frame involving the COVID-19 pandemic, and as a result, the data obtained postMarch 2020 may be misleading.
Definitions
The relevant terms or phrases are defined as follows:
Baker Act: The phrase is utilized on the face of the petitions and is included as an
independent variable. The phrase is used to refer to an individual taken into
custody and placed into a mental health facility because that person is deemed an
immediate threat to themselves or others as a result of mental illness.
Petition: The form filed with the circuit court to initiate the legal procedure seeking the
entry of a risk protection order.
Petitioner: The term used to identify the person or entity seeking the entry of the risk
protection order. In Florida, the Petitioner must be a member of law enforcement.
Red Flag Law/Legislation: The phrase used to describe Florida’s gun control measure for
risk protection orders pursuant to Florida Statute §790.401. The phrase is used
interchangeably with “Risk Protection Order.”
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Respondent: The term used to identify the individual subjected to the risk protection
order.
Risk Protection Order: A judicial order entered pursuant to Florida Statute §790.401 that
prohibits an individual from owning or possessing a firearm for a period of time.
Risk Protection Order is interchangeable with “RPO” and “Red Flag” law.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
There are two components of necessary literature review: (1) available literature
on the efficacy of risk protection orders; and (2) mass homicide offender typology. There
is limited available research examining the legislation, particularly in reference to overall
efficacy when compared with homicide rates because risk protection orders are relatively
new. Because of the limited available research, studies examining prior gun control
measures related to homicide rates and risk protection orders in relation to domestic
violence were included for comparison. There is an abundance of research available
addressing mass homicide offender typology. However, there is considerable debate
amongst researchers regarding how mass homicide should be defined and categorized.
Research identifying overall offender typology was included to establish the necessary
background. In addition, because risk protection orders include identifiable factors related
to mental illness, studies examining the correlation between mental illness and mass
homicide typology were included. There is no known research specifically identifying the
correlation between “Red Flag” gun control legislation and firearm-related homicides
with an emphasis on mass homicide typology. This study examines the missing element
in the available research.
Efficacy of Risk Protection Orders
Connecticut enacted its gun control legislation in 1999, and as such, there is some
available data. However, the data does not specifically relate to the overall reduction in
homicides (Norko & Baranoski, 2014). Norko and Baranoski evaluated Connecticut’s
1999 imminent risk legislation to determine whether the removal of firearms was
significantly correlated with mental health history (Norko & Baranoski, 2014). Similar to
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Florida’s “Red Flag” legislation, Connecticut enacted its gun control law following a
mass homicide incident involving a mentally ill perpetrator (Norko & Baranoski, 2014).
On March 6, 1998, an accountant murdered four co-workers with a firearm and a knife
before committing suicide (Norko & Baranoski, 2014). The individual had significant
mental health history, including depression and suicide attempts (Norko & Baranoski,
2014). Within months of the murders, Connecticut passed Public Act 98-129 requiring
that mental health facilities provide information related to individual commitments to the
State (Norko & Baranoski, 2014). The objective of the legislation was to limit an
individual’s ability to possess a firearm permit if that individual had been committed to a
mental health institution (Norko & Baranoski, 2014). Similar to Florida’s legislation, the
theory was that limiting firearm possession of mentally unstable individuals would
reduce such tragedies.
Analysis of Connecticut’s legislation revealed that as of March 1, 2013, nearly
four years after enactment, approximately 7000 civil commitments were reported to the
State. However, only one person attempted to obtain a firearm permit after a civil
commitment (Norko & Baranoski, 2014). The statistical rate of occurrence was 0.015%
(Norko & Baranoski, 2014). Following Act 98-129, Connecticut passed Act 99-212,
which permitted firearm seizure from any person deemed to pose a “risk of imminent
personal injury to himself or herself or to other individuals” (Norko & Baranoski, 2014).
Almost identical to Florida, judges can review a person’s history with firearms, prior use
of force against others, use of controlled substances, and involuntary psychiatric
hospitalization (Norko & Baranoski, 2014). Norko and Baranoski (2014) evaluated
Connecticut’s imminent risk statute with data from October 1, 1999, through July 31,
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2013, and found that there were 764 warrants for gun seizures, with the majority of
seizures occurring after the Sandy Hook massacre during the four years. Researchers
found that the majority of cases involved no history of psychiatric treatment, and only 1%
of the individuals were in active treatment (Norko & Baranoski, 2014). Thus, the
researchers concluded that mental illness was not significantly correlated with firearm
removal (Norko & Baranoski, 2014).
Kivisto and Phalen (2018) evaluated the correlation between firearm seizure laws
in Indiana and Connecticut and suicide rates between 1981 and 2015 following Indiana’s
enactment of its firearm seizure law. The researchers found a 7.5% reduction in overall
firearm suicides. Furthermore, an analysis of Connecticut’s legislation initially showed a
1.6% reduction in firearm suicide rates. After the legislation was strengthened, the overall
reduction was 13.7%. However, the researchers noted that the data was questionable
because Connecticut’s rates of firearm-related suicide were offset by non-firearm suicides
(Kivisto & Phalen, 2018).
California introduced its risk protection order in 2016 after a mass shooting event
(Wintemute, Pear, Schleimer, Pallin, Shol, Kravitz-Wirtz & Tomsich, 2019). The
researchers evaluated 159 records from 2016 to 2018 to assess the efficacy of risk
protection orders. In total, California only had 414 cases within the relevant time frame.
The researchers concluded that the risk protection orders effectively targeted individuals
posing an imminent threat. However, when evaluating the correlation to possible mass
homicide offenders, the researchers noted that only two known cases nationwide pertain
directly to mass homicide threats (Wintemute et al., 2019). In 2018, an 18-year-old
became the first individual subjected to Vermont’s risk protection legislation after
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making multiple complimentary statements regarding the Parkland massacre, making
threats of attacks, and writing out an entire plan of attack. Likewise, in 2018, a
Washington court entered an order in reference to a man who made multiple known
threats to conduct a mass shooting in a synagogue (Wintemute et al., 2019). In the
California study, researchers found that 13% threatened mass shootings. However, the
authors noted that the figure is likely not representative (Wintemute et al., 2019). The
authors recognized that identifying individuals making mass threats was a critical
component and noted that nearly 80% of known mass homicide offenders had evidence
of significant planning and behavior indicating their intent to carry out an attack
(Wintemute et al., 2019). Arguably, the inclusion of evidence related to planning an
attack would be beneficial when conducting a correlation analysis to identify the
possibility of high-risk offenders.
Researchers conducted the first statewide analysis of Washington’s 2016 risk
protection legislation in 2020 (Rowhani-Rahbar, Bellenger, Gibb, Chesnut, LowrySchiller, Gause, Haviland & Rivara, 2020). Although researchers were able to identify
common factors among the 237 cases, researchers did not conduct any analysis pertaining
to efficacy but noted that further research was necessary (Rowhani-Rahbar et al., 2020).
A team of researchers thereafter published a 2020 study examining risk protection orders
in King County, Washington (Frattaroli, Omaki, Molocznik, Allchin, Hopkins, Shanahan
& Levinson, 2020). Researchers evaluated all petitions filed in 2017 and 2018, obtained
court records associated with the petitions, and then conducted a descriptive analysis of
the coded data (Frattaroli et al., 2020). Only 75 petitions were filed during the study
period, all of which were granted, resulting in a one-year suspension of the individual’s
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ability to possess a firearm (Frattaroli et al., 2020). Notably, the researchers indicated that
five specific cases included a “threat to others” that would have been classified as a mass
shooting threat based upon a review of the individuals’ court records (Frattaroli et al.,
2020). The researchers explained that to classify as a “mass homicide threat,” only two
criteria were necessary: (1) the individual made a clear declaration of intent to commit a
mass shooting or exhibited behavior evidencing such; and (2) the subject had or would
have access to firearms (Frattaroli et al., 2020). In two specific cases, records indicated
that facilities were evacuated because of the individual’s threat (Frattaroli et al., 2020).
The study is the first known study to identify possible offender targets for mass homicide
offenses. However, the study is limited to only 75 petitions filed in one jurisdiction. In
addition, while identifying possible targets is a crucial component of the necessary
research, relying entirely upon allegations in the petition to draw predictive conclusions
as to an individual’s overall propensity to commit mass homicide, has its limitations. The
researchers noted that further research was necessary and that data should include the
perspectives of both the petitioners and the respondents. The Frattaroli et al.’s (2020)
study did not include an analysis of pre-legislation and post-legislation firearm-related
homicide rates.
Researchers recently analyzed Oregon’s risk protection legislation and found that
although the gun control measure seemed to target individuals posing a risk to themselves
or others, more work was needed to target high-risk individuals (Zeoli, Paruk, Branas,
Carter, Cunningham, Heinze & Webster, 2021). Oregon’s legislation is similar to
Florida’s. However, family and household members may file a petition seeking firearm
removal (Zeoli et al., 2021). The researchers analyzed all petitions filed within the state
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of Oregon during a 15-month period. However, only 119 petitions were filed, and 26
were excluded from the analysis. Thus, only 93 petitions were evaluated (Zeoli et al.,
2021). Similar to Florida, Oregon uses a standard checklist format in its petition.
Researchers identified characteristics for both the petitioners and respondents from the
available data contained on the petition. The overwhelming majority of cases (73%)
involved individuals with a history of suicidal ideation (Zeoli et al., 2021). This statistic
is consistent with other studies conducted in various states (Frattaroli et al., 2020;
Rowhani-Rahbar, Bellenger, Gibb, Chesnut, Lowry-Schiller, Gause, Haviland & Rivara,
2020; Swanson, Norko, Alanis-Hirsch, Frisman, Baranoski & Bonnie, 2017; Swanson et
al., 2019). Notably, 70% of the individuals in the suicide category likewise threatened
others’ safety, such as domestic partners (Zeoli et al., 2021). Approximately 75% of
respondents were involved in some type of interpersonal violence (Zeoli et al., 2021).
Researchers found that five individuals made threats of school-related violence (Zeoli et
al., 2021). Overall, the researchers concluded that sufficient evidence indicated that the
risk protection orders targeted individuals posing a threat to themselves or others (Zeoli
et al., 2021). However, researchers note that the link between suicidality and threats of
violence is not demonstrated in other studies. Studies conducted in other states, including
California, Indiana, and Washington, did not find such evidence (Frattaroli et al., 2020;
Parker, 2015; Swanson et al., 2017; Zeoli et al., 2021). Researchers explained that the
differences in the studies could be the result of the data contained on the petitions
themselves. If the petition does not identify the different types of threats of violence, it
would be impossible to conduct any type of correlation analysis. Researchers noted that
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the variability in the information provided on the petitions poses a significant limitation
to study further.
Gun Control Comparison
There is no reliable empirical data to analyze critical variables, including firearmrelated homicide rates because risk protection legislation is in its infancy. However, a
comparative analysis is available for previous gun control measures, such as the assault
weapons ban in the US, weapon bans in Australia and Canada, and domestic violencerelated gun control measures. Fox and DeLateur conducted a 2014 study evaluating FBI
Supplementary Homicide Report data, including 672 mass shootings from 1976 to 2011
in relation to various gun control measures (Fox & DeLateur, 2014). The researchers
included all homicides that included at least four victims in the sample (Fox & DeLateur,
2014). Ultimately, the researchers found no increase in shootings during the time frame.
The researchers found that the 10-year window of the 1994 federal ban on assault
weapons showed no effect on mass homicide or murder in general (Fox & DeLateur,
2014). Likewise, an examination of the “right to carry” laws from 1977 to 1999
concluded that the impact of the legislation was negligible in reference to homicide and
had no relationship to mass shootings (Fox & DeLateur, 2014). The researchers
concluded that gun control measures were ineffective preventative measures against mass
homicide. However, the authors noted possible benefits from a broader public health
perspective (Fox & DeLatuer, 2014).
Similarly, Gius conducted a 2014 study analyzing the effects of concealed
weapons laws and assault weapons bans on state-level murder rates and, interestingly,
found an increase in gun-related murders (Gius, 2014). The authors used a fixed-effects
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model to examine homicide rates from 1980 to 2009 at the state level. The dependent
variable was the murder rate. The authors created dummy variables for weapon
control/ban. Independent variables included state demographics and socioeconomic
factors. The overall homicide incident data was obtained from the US DOJ
Supplementary Homicide Reports. The results demonstrated that states with restrictions
on carrying concealed weapons had higher gun-related murder rates than other states.
Specifically, when the concealed weapon ban dummy variable was utilized, the overall
incident rate was 10% higher (Gius, 2014). Assault weapons bans did not significantly
affect murder rates (Gius, 2014). In fact, the authors found that homicide rates were
19.3% higher during the applicable time frame for the assault weapon ban (Gius, 2014).
The authors noted several limitations to the study and questioned whether the laws were
enforced properly and whether the states where gun control measures were enacted had
higher firearm-related crimes when compared at the state level (Gius, 2014). Thus, there
are additional factors that could not be controlled, and as such, the findings are limited.
Kwon and Baack concluded in a 2005 study that variables associated with law
enforcement and socio-economic factors may be as significant as gun control measures
(Kwon & Baack, 2005). The researchers analyzed state gun control measures to evaluate
the effectiveness of the legislation on overall homicide rates (Kwon & Baack, 2005). The
study used a multivariate linear regression analysis to analyze the relationship between
variables, including gun control measures and firearm deaths per 100,000 inhabitants of
each state. The dependent variable was derived from the annual publication Vital and
Health Statistics of the Center of Disease Control and Prevention National Vital Statistic
Report for 2000 (Kwon & Baack, 2005). The data included suicides, homicides, firearm
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accidents, legal interventions, and deaths of unknown intent. Twenty-four states were
included in the study, and the state with the highest rate of firearm deaths was Alaska
(Kwon & Baack, 2005). A number of independent variables were considered: race,
number of LEO employees, unemployment rate, population density, and gun control
legislation (Kwon & Baack, 2005). The results demonstrated that comprehensive gun
control lowered the number of gun-related deaths between one to six per 100,000
individuals in the states that have the most extreme legislation (Kwon & Baack, 2005).
However, socio-economic and law enforcement factors are equal to gun control measures
when evaluating gun-related fatalities (Kwon & Baack, 2005). There were significant
limitations involving a large number of factors, including law enforcement, controlling
for gun control measures had significant limitations (Kwon & Baack, 2005).
Gun control measures vary greatly between jurisdictions, so it is critical to
identify the particular measure in question when evaluating overall efficacy related to
homicide rates. Researchers in 2005 conducted a cross-sectional time study of firearm
mortality rates from 1979 to 1998 and compared the data to five specific gun control
laws: (1) “shall issue” laws allowing an individual to carry a concealed weapon, (2) a
minimum age of 21 for handgun purchase, (3) minim age of 21 for private handgun
possession, (4) one gun a month law that limits purchase frequency, and (5) junk gun
laws which ban the sale of certain cheaply constructed handguns (Rosengart, Cummings,
Nathens, Heagerty, Maier & Rivara, 2005). A sample from all 50 states was included.
The researchers found that “shall issue” laws were correlated with a higher firearm
mortality rate than in jurisdictions that did not contain the legislation. However, none of
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the control measures resulted in decreased firearm mortality rates (Rosengart et al.,
2005).
Studies evaluating the link between gun control measures and homicide rates are
not limited to the United States. Baker and McPhedran conducted a study evaluating
Australia’s gun control measures following a 1996 mass shooting incident (Baker &
McPhedran, 2007). Following the massacre, Australia enacted expansive gun control
legislation, and the purpose of the study was to examine the relationship between the
legislation and firearm-related homicidal incidents (Baker & McPhedran, 2007). The
study utilized publicly available data from 1979 to 2004 involving homicide rates. The
emphasis was on firearm homicides, suicide, and accidental death. However, the authors
examined trends in homicide (non-firearm) and suicide (non-firearm) to address
questions related to confounding factors. The authors used the Auto Regressive
Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model to predict selected sudden death categories
(Baker & McPhedran, 2007). Suicide rates post-legislation were consistently lower than
the predicted values. The authors noted that additional study was necessary because the
model appeared to reflect that there had been an increase in suicides immediately prior to
the enactment of the legislation. The ARIMA model was not effective in predicting nonfirearm-related incidences when compared to observed values. Ultimately, the results
suggested that the gun control legislation decreased the rate of firearm suicide in
Australia. However, similar to Fox and DeLateur’s 2014 study, the authors noted that the
legislation had no impact on homicide patterns (Baker & McPhedran, 2007; Fox &
DeLateur, 2014).

25
A similar study evaluated the effect of Canada’s 1995 gun control legislation
requiring licensure and registration on accidental, suicidal, and homicidal deaths (Bridges
& Kunselmann, 2004). The researchers obtained publicly available data for the death
statistics for the 1970–1995-time frame. The authors obtained data from the Canadian
Mortality Database and Homicide Survey for three categories of incidents: the rate of
accidental death from firearms, the average of the percentages of suicides and homicides
by firearm, and the average of the percentages of suicides and murders by firearm. The
authors utilized a Pearson correlation coefficient to determine the relationship between
the variables (Bridges & Kunselmann, 2004). The availability of firearms was positively
associated with the rate of homicide by firearms but not negatively associated with the
rate of homicide by other means. Ultimately, the researchers found that during the 1974–
1999-time frame, there was a decrease over time in total suicide and homicide rates for
both firearm and non-firearm related incidents (Bridges & Kunselmann, 2004). The
authors noted that although overall access to firearms was reduced, rates of utilizing other
methods to commit suicide increased (Bridges & Kunselmann, 2004).
Although “Red Flag” laws are too new for existing empirical data, a comparative
analysis could be made to studies designed to test the efficacy of gun control laws on
domestic violence homicide offenses. Some studies evaluating homicide rates in states
that restrict ownership of firearms based on either restraining orders or domestic violence
convictions, show a reduction in firearm-related homicides (Vigdor & Mercy, 2006).
Vigdor and Mercy found that in states that combine restraining orders with purchasing
restrictions, the result was a 10% decrease in firearm-related homicide (Vigdor & Mercy,
2006). However, because the overall incident rate is statistically low, a 10% decrease

26
constituted a reduction of approximately 2 homicides (Vigdor & Mercy, 2006). Similarly,
researchers concluded in a 2017 study that gun control measures restricting ownership
and requiring firearm surrender resulted in a 14% reduction in firearm-related domestic
related homicide rates (Diez, Kurland, Rothman, Bair-Merrit, Fleegler, Zuan, Galea,
Ross, Kalesan, Goss & Siegel, 2017). In contrast, other studies have found no net positive
results in firearm-related homicides in reference to gun control legislation (Kleck &
Patterson, 1993). Kleck and Patterson assert that it is difficult to control for the litany of
independent variables that may explain overall reduction in firearm-related homicides
that are unrelated to gun control legislation, including pre-intervention efforts (Kleck &
Patterson, 1993). Kleck and Patterson analyzed 29 studies evaluating the relationship
between legislation and homicides. The vast majority showed no impact at all, and the
few that showed favorable or mixed results were considered to be of questionable
reliability because of the study parameters (Kleck & Patterson, 1993). Despite the
negative findings, Kleck and Patterson recognize that gun control legislation may have a
positive impact with certain types of offenders, including those who would likely only
attack from a distance and who would not use a more personal form of attack, such as
knives (Kleck & Patterson, 1993).
Frattaroli and Teret examined Maryland’s Gun Violence Act of 1996 as applied to
firearm surrender requirements related to domestic violence (Frattaroli & Teret, 2006).
The Act authorized courts to order domestic batterers to surrender firearms through civil
protective orders. The authors used a single-case, embedded design that allowed for an
independent analysis of the court-ordered surrender provisions. The authors selected one
urban, two suburban, and one rural locality as study sites. The authors did not intend to
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generalize the findings to the population level. The data was derived from semistructured
key informant interviews, field notes based on observations of protective order hearings,
and documents related to the implementation process (Frattaroli & Teret, 2006). During
11 days of observation, the authors witnessed 27 protective order hearings and in five of
the cases, the victims described firearms as part of the abuse. All five hearings resulted in
protective orders being issued, but none of the orders required surrender (Frattaroli &
Teret, 2006). Interviews with participants suggested deficiencies in the legislation related
to the process for initiating the complaint and in securing an order for surrender
(Frattaroli & Teret, 2006). The researchers noted that because state gun control measures
often lack clarity and are dependent upon judicial discretion, evaluating efficacy has
inherent limitations (Frattaroli & Teret, 2006).
Although most risk protection laws are created as a result of mass homicide
incidences, the majority of firearm-related deaths are related to suicide (Pew Research
Center, 2019). Andres and Hempstead conducted a study analyzing the relationship
between firearm regulations and suicide among males (Andres & Hampstead, 2011). The
authors noted that suicide is the 8th leading cause of death for males and that firearms are
used in approximately 50% of suicides (Andres & Hampstead, 2011). Both the WHO and
the CDC recommend restricting access to firearms as a method of suicide prevention
(Andres & Hampstead, 2011). The study analyzed specific types of gun control measures
throughout the United States and utilized negative binomial regression to evaluate male
suicide rates from 1995-2004 (Andres & Hampstead, 2011). The dependent variable was
male suicide rate broken into age categories, and the independent variables included
socio-economic factors, gun supply and firearm regulations (Andres & Hampstead,

28
2011). The researchers found that firearm regulations designed to reduce overall gun
availability had a significant deterrent effect on suicide. The most significant gun control
measures were permit requirements and bans on sales to minors (Andres & Hampstead,
2011). Notably, legislation targeting specific individuals from possession or owning
firearms had less of an effect (Andres & Hampstead, 2011). Although the Andres &
Hampstead study has particular significance when evaluating general prohibitions versus
targeting specific individuals within a population group, such as the risk protection
orders, the study did not describe with sufficient detail the various gun control measures
evaluated.
Similarly, a 2014 study evaluating the relationship between firearm control for
individuals with serious mental illness and overall rates of murder by firearm ultimately
concluded that legislation targeting individuals with mental illness for firearm removal
will have little impact on mass homicide or firearm-related homicides (Matejkowski,
Fairfax-Columbo, Cullen, Marcus & Solomon, 2014). The study included data from the
official arrest records and court/health records on 95 individuals with serious mental
illness, and 423 individuals without mental illness, all of whom had been convicted of
murder in Indiana between 1990 and 2002 (Matejkowski et al., 2014). The authors used a
bivariate analysis to examine the differences between the two groups and logistic
regression models examined the relationship between the mental illness and offense
characteristics (Matejkowski et al., 2014). Ultimately, only a small proportion of the
convicted murderers had serious mental illness. Although mental illness was correlated
with a greater likelihood of targeting a stranger, it was not correlated with mass homicide
or firearm use in general (Matejkowski et al., 2014).
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Although most of the literature supports the theory that gun control measures do
not significantly impact firearm-related homicides, or mass homicides in general, there is
support for the theory that mere firearm ownership is correlated with firearm homicide
rates (Siegel, Ross & King, 2013). The purpose of the Siegel et al. (2013) study was to
evaluate the correlation between household gun ownership and overall firearm-related
homicide rates throughout the United States (Siegel et al., 2013). The researchers
conducted a negative binomial regression analysis of the data from CDC’s Web-Based
Injury Statistics Query Systems Database on gun ownership and homicide rates from
1981 to 2010 for all 50 states (Siegel , et al, 2013). Ultimately, the researchers found that
gun ownership was a significant predictor of firearm homicide rates (Siegel et al., 2013).
Similarly, a 2015 study found that mass shootings are associated with an increase
in the number of monthly NICS background checks in reference to firearm purchases
(Wallace, 2015). The purpose of the study was to evaluate the link between mass
shooting incidences and rates of gun acquisition. Researchers used panel-data linear
models and included a sample from six mass shooting incidents from 2000-2010
(Wallace, 2015). The theory postulated that if gun ownership correlates with higher rates
of firearm-related homicides, then the opposite must also be true; however, the literature
consensus does not support that contention.
Mass Homicide Typology
If the purpose of “Red Flag” laws is to prevent mass shootings, or to lessen the
lethality rate, then an evaluation of the offender typology is necessary. The FBI has found
no psychological profile containing identifiable personality or character traits that could
be used as predictors to determine possible offenders (Agnich, 2015). The typology may
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vary depending upon the type of mass homicide offender (Fridel, 2021). Recent research
suggests that mass homicide offenders should be grouped into different categories,
including family killers, public killers, and felony killers (Fridel, 2021). Family killers
tend to target spouses and children, and generally commit suicide after the event (Fridel,
2021). Public killers can either target known victims, strangers or a combination (Fridel,
2021). Felony killers are those who commit murders involving four or more individuals
during the commission of a particular felony, such as drug-related offenses, eliminating
witnesses, etc. (Fridel, 2021). Each type of offender would classify as a mass homicide
offender if the individual killed four or more people in the same incident without a
cooling-off period. However, researchers suggest that the typology of each type of
offender may vary (Fridel, 2021). Although there is wide variance in offender typology,
there is consistent research identifying a number of typology characteristics, including
demographics, motivating factors, evidence of planning, and precipitating factors
evidencing strain.
General Characteristics
Capellan and Gomez conducted research in 2016 examining 294 mass public
shootings in the United States from 1984 to 2015 (Capellan & Gomez, 2017). Most
offenders are male and are often middle-aged (Duwe, 2004; Fox & Levin, 2003; Levin &
Madfis, 2009). Capellan and Gomez confirmed that 97.7% of offenders from 1985-1999,
and 96.1% of offenders from 2000-2015 were males with an average age ranging from
31.7 to 36.6 (Capellan & Gomez, 2017). Earlier shootings reflected that a strong 73.8%
majority of offenders were white. However, the proportion dropped to 55.7% for later

31
offenses from 2000-2015 reflecting a possible demographic shift (Capellan & Gomez,
2017).
Many offenders present with “warrior mentality” and have a fascination with
weapons and military-style training (Hempel et al. 1999). Capellan and Gomez did not
control for firearm fascination, but included data indicating that 10.2% of offenders were
either veterans or active military (Capellan & Gomez, 2017).
Offenders often exhibit a pattern of externalizing blame for their own perceived
failures (Duwe, 2004; Fox & Levin, 2003). Many are identified as “loners” or present as
socially isolated (Hempel et al., 1999). Some researchers have suggested that actual
social isolation is not necessary; rather, the issue relates to the offender’s perception of
social isolation (Dutton et al., 2013). Many offenders present with a paranoid personality
type with “malignant narcissism,” wherein the offender perceives isolation, and then
obsesses over the individuals responsible for the offender’s marginalization (Dutton et
al., 2013).
There is a distinction between homicide offenders and mass homicide offenders in
reference to suicide. Only 4% of homicide offenders commit suicide; however, up to 50%
of mass homicide offenders commit suicide after the incident (Fridel, 2021). Researchers
have suggested that all mass shooters are suicidal prior to the event because they do not
anticipate escaping (Fridel, 2021; Lankford, 2015). Some researchers have taken the
argument further to suggest that most mass homicide offenders are motivated to commit
suicide, but first kills another for some other motivating reason such as revenge (Fridel,
2021; Frazier, 1975; Palermo, 1994).
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Finally, there is debate regarding the role of mental illness. Much of the available
research indicates that mental illness is not generally correlated, but that many offenders
are identified with atypical behaviors and certain personality traits such as antisocial
personality and narcissism (Hempel et al., 1999, Levin & Madfis, 2009). Some
researchers suggest that many offenders experienced long-term mental health struggles
from anecdotal evidence. However, the researchers note that the offenders were never
formally diagnosed (Lankford & Silva, 2021). Thus, although there may be anecdotal
support for the contention that an offender may have suffered from mental illness, there is
not significant data supporting the correlation from a diagnostic perspective.
Revenge
Early research created motive-based categories to define mass homicide typology
(Fox & Levin, 1998). Fox and Levin argued that the majority of offenders presented with
clear motives centered on revenge, power, loyalty, profit, and terror (Fox & Levin, 1998).
Revenge was seen as the critical motivating factor and was likely caused by a long
history of frustration or failure (Fox & Levin, 1998; Duwe, 2013). Revenge is often
associated with school and workplace shooters, of whom identify a desire to seek revenge
on specific individuals (Fridel, 2021). The offender may seek revenge against a particular
person. However, revenge may also be sought against society at large, or groups of
individuals (Bowers et al., 2009). Capellan and Gomez confirmed the existing data, and
found that revenge accounts for the majority of mass public shootings at 56.1% (Capellan
& Gomez, 2017). The researchers noted that there was a noticeable increase in revengerelated shootings from 2000-2015 when compared to previous decades. In early decades,
autogenic motivating factors (40.9%) were on par with revenge (48.8%) (Capellan &
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Gomez, 2017). If the motivating factor is revenge, the offender will likely target specific
individuals. While there is a perception that mass homicide is random and is conducted
by an individual who has gone “berserk,” the majority of offenders target specific victims
of whom are perceived to be the cause of the offender’s frustration or failure (Fox et al.,
2018). The vast majority of victims know the offender, and only 24% of offenses
committed between 1900 and 1999 involve strangers (Duwe, 2013). This research is
consistent with Dutton et al.’s findings regarding the role of externalizing blame and
obsessing over those perceived to be responsible for the offender’s marginalization
(Dutton, et al., 2013).
While revenge may highlight a motivating factor for school and workplace
shooters, not all public mass homicides are motivated by revenge. Acts of domestic
terrorism, such as the 2016 Pulse Nightclub shooting, and the 2015 Charleston Church
attacks, were likely motivated by the desire to instill fear and spread ideological messages
(Fridel, 2021). Likewise, some attacks, such as the 2012 Aurora, Colorado movie theater
attack, appear to have been motivated by delusions caused by psychosis (Fridel, 2021).
Precipitating Factors
Nearly 90% of adult offenders involve a precipitating factor such as a loss of a
relationship or loss of employment (Levin & Madfis, 2009; Fridel, 2021). Precipitating
factors are less common with adolescent offenders; however, precipitating factors may
include excessive bullying, of which is associated with adolescent offenders (Levin &
Madfis, 2009; Bowers, Holmes & Rhom, 2010). Research has found that 88% of school
shooters had experienced some type of school-related problem prior to the incident
(Lankford & Silva, 2021). The same study found that 97% of offenders who committed
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workplace shootings had experienced work-related problems (Lankford & Silva, 2021).
Capellan and Gomez reported that the majority of public shootings, (53.6%), between
1984-1999 could be traced to a specific precipitating event (Capellan and Gomez, 2017).
The percentage increased to 63% for the 2000-2015 time frame. Likewise, Fridel found
that precipitating factors involving strain commonly precede incidences involving family
killings (Fridel, 2021).
Evidence of Planning
The typical pattern involves a well-calculated, and sometimes sophisticated plot,
similar to methods used by serial homicide offenders, and the offenses are not committed
in the form of random isolation (Levin & Madfis, 2009). Fox and Levin argue that if the
offender is motivated by a “specific and focused” type of revenge, there will often be
significant evidence of methodical planning (Fox & Levin, 1998). Capellan and Gomez
reported similar findings in their 2016 study. A strong majority of offenders (59.8% to
68.8%) evidenced medium to high levels of planning prior to committing the homicidal
act (Capellan & Gomez, 2017). Only 4.6% of shooters engaged in no planning prior to
committing the act (Capellan & Gomez, 2017). Notably, Capellan and Gomez found that
only 29.9% of offenders discussed their plans prior to committing the act during the
2000-2015 time frame. Almost half of offenders, 42.4%, are known to have discussed
their plans prior to committing the act during the 1985-1999 time frame (Capellan &
Gomez, 2017). From a policy perspective, the researchers emphasized that victimspecific shooters often raised multiple red flags prior to the mass homicide incident
including making threats of attacks, and discussing or fantasizing about plans to others,
(Capellan & Gomez, 2017). The researchers cautioned that although there was a decline
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in the percentage of offenders discussing plans prior to the incident, such statements
remain a critical variable for prevention strategy (Capellan & Gomez, 2017). Notably, a
2002 study analyzing 37 school shootings determined that in 66% of cases, the offender
discussed his/her plans prior to committing the act (Vossekuil, Fein, Reddy, Borum &
Modzeleski, 2002). Evidence of planning is a critical component that should not be
overlooked by policymakers, particularly as it relates to the level of detail and planning
that an offender engages in preparation for the massacre.
Evidence of Strain
Mass homicide offenders often present with long histories of frustration,
humiliation, and failure (Aitken et al., 2008; Bowers et al., 2010). Levin and Madfis
attempted to develop an explanatory theory applied to mass homicide offenders involving
five stages: (1) chronic strain; (2) uncontrolled strain; (3) acute strain; (4) planning stage;
and (5) the massacre (Levin & Madfis, 2009). Levin and Madfis used case studies to
analyze factors present in each stage, including chronic rejection, social isolation, and
bullying/harassment (Levin & Madfis, 2009). Chronic strain relates to frustration as a
result of failure to obtain one’s goals. (Levin & Madfis, 2009). A lack of social restraint
can lead to uncontrolled strain whereby the individual expresses the frustration associated
with chronic strain in a delinquent manner (Levin & Madfis, 2009). Many adolescent
school shooters experienced chronic strain for years despite having a stable family life, of
which systematically develops into uncontrolled strain and acute strain (Levin & Madfis,
2009). The experience of chronic strain may also lead the individual to hyper-focus on
blaming others for their frustrations. Acute strain is often caused by a precipitating factor,
such as a loss of job, or academic failure (Levin & Madfis, 2009). Immediately following
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the acute strain, or precipitating factor, the individual begins the planning stage. Levin
and Madfis isolated their research to known case studies. Because mass homicides in
general are statistically rare, the sample size is small and as such, the study could not be
generalized (Levin & Madfis, 2009).
Much of the literature identifies mass homicide offenders as “loners” of whom
dealt with prolonged strain without the constraints of social norms (Fridel, 2021). Some
suggest that the offenders suffered from excessive bullying. However, others suggest that
the individual’s experience may have been exacerbated by psychological conditions, such
as narcissism or paranoia (Fridel, 2021). Researchers theorize that individuals experience
strain, externalize the blame towards others, and hyper-focus on the underlying
frustrations, all of which can lead to “violent revenge fantasies” (Fox & Levin, 1994;
Fridel, 2021; Lankford & Silva, 2021; Vossekuil et al., 2002;).
Leary et al. (2003) observed a similar typology in reference to school shooters.
However, the authors noted that the limited sample size presents significant barriers to
overall interpretation. The purpose of the study was to analyze the role of interpersonal
rejection (strain), on school violence. The authors analyzed a sample of case studies
involving school shooting incidents from 1995 to 2001. The researchers gathered data on
each incident including: (1) whether the perpetrator had experienced ostracism or
bullying; (2) an interest in guns, bombs or explosives; (3) a fascination with death; or (4)
showed evidence of psychological disorder prior to the shooting (Leary et al., 2003). The
total sample included 15 cases (Leary et al., 2003). Interpersonal rejection was indicated
in almost all cases, and in at least 12 cases, the perpetrator was subject to malicious
teasing/bullying (Leary et al., 2003). Victims often included individuals who teased,
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bullied or rejected the shooter (Leary et al., 2003). Precipitating factors were only present
in six cases (Leary et al., 2003). Notably, in this particular sample, ten out of the fifteen
total cases, demonstrated some evidence of psychological problems (Leary et al., 2003).
Although the research is consistent that mass homicide typology generally involves some
kind of strain, of which may be associated with a perception of rejection, the limited
sample size impedes interpretation. Despite the limitations associated with the studies,
there is a consensus involving the presence of both strain and precipitating factors.
Mental Illness
Notably, one of the key factors missing from much of the research is the role of
mental illness (Taylor, 2018). The media often portrays offenders as mentally ill, young,
White males. However, the data does not support such contention (Taylor, 2018).
Although much of the research, of which often emanates from media reports,
acknowledges that offenders may suffer mental illness, it is not included in most of the
typologies (Fox & Levin, 1998; Taylor, 2018). Taylor conducted a 2018 study analyzing
152 mass murders from 2007-2011 to identify motivating factors for mass homicide
offenders and noted that mental illness is rarely a factor for mass homicide offenders
(Taylor, 2018). Taylor analyzed a number of variables, including emotional triggers,
general relationship issues, financial concerns, mental health, criminal gain and political
motivation (Taylor, 2018). Similar to Fox and Levin, Taylor found that triggering events
tended to precede the homicide incidences (Taylor, 2018). However, from a public health
perspective, Taylor suggests that if an individual suffers from social isolation and is
exposed to some triggering factor, mental health treatment as a form of intervention may
be an appropriate preventative measure (Taylor, 2018).
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One of the few studies evaluating the mental health link was conducted in 2001
by Meloy, Hempel, Mohandie, Shiva and Gray (Meloy et al., 2001). The study involved a
nonrandom sample of adolescent murderers. Researchers evaluated 27 incidents with 34
adolescent offenders (Meloy et al., 2001). The offenses occurred between 1958 and 1999
(Meloy et al., 2001). Only twenty-three percent of the children (7/30, had documented
mental health history. However, only two of the children (or six percent), presented with
psychotic features at the time of the offense (Meloy et al., 2001). Seventy percent of the
children were described as “loners,” 17% had a history of bullying others and 43% were
bullied themselves (Meloy et al., 2001). The majority of the children came from intact
families with only 37% coming from divorced/separated homes. Forty-four percent were
described as “fantasizers” who had a preoccupation with fantasy, and forty-two percent
had violent history. Forty-six percent had prior arrest history, and sixty-two percent had
documented substance abuse history. The researchers concluded that an adolescent
murderer is often predatory and does not necessarily show sudden or highly emotional
warning signs (Meloy, et al, 2001).
The USA Today research compilation included mental health treatment and
diagnosis as a variable when evaluating the 317 incidents between 2006 and 2016 (Fox et
al., 2018). While the Meloy et al.’s study found a correlation of only 23% of offenders
with prior mental health history, Mother Jones reports that nearly 60% of the offenders
involved in the 2006 to 2016 offenses had noticeable mental health warning signs (Fox et
al., 2018). The media often places emphasis on the purported link between mental health
and mass homicide. However, the majority of the data identifying mental health history
originated from neighbors, friends, associates, etc., and the anecdotal information was
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presented after the incident, and as such, the reliability of the data may be questionable
(Fox et al., 2018; Taylor, 2018). Fox, Levin and Fridel highlight that approximately
12.5% of the offenders were psychotic at the time of the offense, and another 12.5%
presented with symptoms of depression or anxiety (Fox et al., 2018). However, when
compared to the average incident rate of depression/anxiety within the general
population, currently 18.1%, the 12.5% rate does not appear to be statistically out of
range (Fox et al., 2018). This figure would be consistent with the limited findings
established in the Meloy, et al. study. Overall, there is no literature to support the
inclusion of mental illness in mass homicide offender typology.
Mental illness is a factor that courts may consider pursuant to “Red Flag” laws.
However, if there is a weak correlation between mass shooters’ mental health and the
crime itself, then it is plausible that an emphasis on mental health misses the point.
Notably, this is precisely what the researchers found in Norko and Baranoski’s 2014
study finding only 1% of the individuals subjected to risk protection orders were
receiving mental health treatment (Norko & Baranoski, 2014). Likewise, if offender
typology involves calculated attacks, planned over weeks, months or even years, then
restricting gun possession would arguably have no impact on preventing the offense
because the offender could simply wait until the order expires, or could elect an
alternative means to facilitate the crime.
Domestic Violence
Although the public perception of mass homicide often relates to public
shootings, the majority of mass homicide incidences involve family killings (Duwe,
2013). Taylor conducted an analysis on mass murders from 2007 to 2011, and identified
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the victim/offender relationship as, (1) stranger, (2) family, (3) acquaintance, or (4)
combination of victim types (Taylor, 2018). Family-related mass homicide incidences
accounted for 42.76% of all cases (Taylor, 2018). Stranger and acquaintance cases
combined constituted 31.58% (Taylor, 2018). Taylor found that 50.66% of offenders
experienced a known precipitating event prior to the offense, and 38.16% of offenders
had evidence of relationship issues (Taylor, 2018).
A similar evaluation of homicides from the 2011 National Violent Death
Reporting System confirms Taylor’s findings and demonstrates that 48% of homicides
occurred in the home, and approximately 38% of victims knew the perpetrator (Fan,
2015). The data demonstrated that the most prevalent risk factor for homicide was
interpersonal violence in the past month and other interpersonal relationship problems
(Fan, 2015).
Identifying Risk Factors as Prevention
The objective of Florida’s Red Flag law is prevention. Gun control is only one
means of preventing mass incidences, and there is literature identifying possible
prevention strategies that go beyond removing firearms. Identifying risk factors is critical
for determining appropriate prevention strategies (Lankford & Silva, 2021). Calhoun and
Weston developed a model, Path to Intended Violence, to demonstrate the offender’s
progression towards violence (Calhoun & Weston, 2003).

The model was originally

derived from the Exceptional Case Study Project (ECSP) developed by the United States
Secret Service for assassination threat assessment, but researchers found that school
shooters often followed similar violence trajectory (Fein & Vossekuil, 1997; Vossekuil et
al., 2004). Calhoun and Weston identified six specific steps in the violence model: (1)
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grievance, (2) violent ideation, (3) research and planning, (4) pre-attack preparation, (5)
probing and breaches, and (6) the attack (Calhoun & Weston, 2003). The stages correlate
with strain, revenge and planning.
Building upon the ECSP, the Secret Service and the Department of Education
created the Safe School Initiative to address targeted violence within schools (Vossekuil,
et al., 2002). Like Florida’s Red Flag law, the Safe School Initiative was developed after
the Columbine High School mass attack in 1999 (Vossekuil, et al., 2002). The purpose
was to identify information prior to the attack, and to incorporate preventative strategies
(Vossekuil, et al., 2002). Researchers studied 37 school incidences involving targeted
school violence from 1974 to 2000. The researchers identified 10 critical findings, of
which are nearly identical to mass homicide offenders, in general:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Incidents are rarely sudden or impulsive;
Other people were aware of the offender’s intentions prior to the act;
Most offenders did not threaten an individual target directly;
There is no accurate profile of the offender;
Most offenders engaged in concerning behavior prior to the attack;
Most had difficulty coping, suffered strain, and many considered
suicide;
7. Many felt persecuted or bullied by others;
8. Most had access to weapons;
9. Some offenders had help from others; and
10. Law enforcement was not the primary tool to prevent offenses in most
incidences.

(Vossekuil, et al., 2002).
Subsequent research has confirmed that many mass homicide offenders publicize
their intentions prior to committing the act providing a critical opportunity for
intervention (Lankford & Silva, 2021). Lankford and Silva noted three primary examples
of previous shooters in their 2021 study. The 2007 Virginia Tech shooter made multiple
threats to professors regarding committing a mass shooting event and clearly expressed

42
his desire to kill every person at the school. The 2016 Orlando Pulse nightclub shooter
bragged to his co-workers that he wanted to die as a “martyr” and suggested attacking a
club to his wife. The 2018 Parkland school shooter threatened to kill his classmates on
multiple occasions (Lankford & Silva, 2021). Case study analysis on the Parkland
shooter revealed that at least 30 people had first-hand knowledge of the offender’s
behavior and express threats (Schildkraut, Cowan, & Mosher, 2022). Express statements
of intent to commit mass homicide would obviously trigger preventative responses;
however, many of the witnesses who heard the first-hand statements downplayed the
severity despite some expressing fear (Schildkraut, et al., 2022).
Some researchers note that risk protection orders may have been useful in
preventing the incidences (Lankford & Silva, 2021). However, the risk protection order
is often seen as a possible preventative measure along with other tools, such as
community intervention (Lankford & Silva, 2021). Researchers have suggested multiple
approaches for prevention, of which included mental health, community and law
enforcement measures (Lankford & Silva, 2021). Other researchers highlight the
problems regarding information-sharing. In some circumstances, such as the Parkland
shooting, there were multiple reports to numerous agencies, including the FBI; however,
the information did not appear centralized (Schildkraut, et al., 2022). Researchers
propose a countywide or state-level “fusion center” to maintain databases designed to
collect and share information regarding at-risk individuals (Schildkraut, et al., 2022). If
the offenders can be identified prior to committing the act, then a multi-faceted approach
could be utilized to remove firearms, address mental health concerns, and to work with
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employers and/or school officials to address associated problems (Lankford & Silva,
2021).
The multi-disciplinary approach is consistent with the findings from Vossekuil et
al., (2002) research regarding the Safe School Initiative. Vossekuil et al., ultimately
recommended the creation of a threat assessment, and the inclusion of multiple entities
from education officials, community programs and law enforcement. In addition, the
researchers suggested substantial information-sharing (Vossekuil, et al., 2002).
Summary
There is substantial debate regarding classification of mass homicide offenders,
and the typology may vary depending upon the classification. However, regardless of the
classification, there is significant literature to support the contention that mass homicide
offenders may be motivated by revenge, may suffer from chronic strain, experience
precipitating events, and may engage in long-term planning. Identifying key
characteristics is critical in evaluating policy and creating effective preventative
measures. As states continue to enact “Red Flag” laws it will be important to conduct
further study to determine how the laws are operating in practice, who the laws are
targeting, and whether the laws have any correlation with mass shootings or firearmrelated homicides in general. This study examines two research questions designed to
evaluate whether the gun control measure reduced overall firearm-related homicides, and
whether the measure is effective at targeting possible high risk mass homicide offenders.
The next chapter discusses the research methodology used in the present study.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
The study aims to determine the efficacy of Florida’s “Red Flag” legislation from
two perspectives: (1) Whether there is a difference between rates of homicide prior to and
after legislative implementation, and (2) Whether the orders target individuals
demonstrating known mass homicide offender typology characteristics. The following
research questions guide this study:
1. Is there a difference between rates of firearm-related homicide incidences prior to,
and after, the creation of Florida’s “Red Flag” law?
2. Do risk protection orders target individuals demonstrating known mass homicide
offender typology characteristics?
To the researcher’s knowledge, this study establishes the very first acknowledged
analysis of Florida’s 2018 Risk Protection legislation.
Participants
This study used pre-existing secondary data to answer the research questions.
Two datasets were collected to answer the first research question. The first dataset
included reports of acts of homicide associated with firearms for years 1999 to 2020. This
data is publicly available from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement’s Uniform
Crime Reports. For comparison, the researcher included suicide data for the same time
frame, obtained from the Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Vital Statistics. To
compare data from year to year, while accounting for populations change, the researcher
collected population information from the Office of Economic and Demographic
Research website.
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The dataset for the second research question was a list of 556 individuals
subjected to risk protection petitions from three separate Florida counties, Pinellas (N =
245), Broward (N = 269), and Seminole (N = 42). All petitions filed in the respective
counties for the relevant time frame, March 2018-March 2019, were included in the
study. This information is publicly available pursuant to Florida Statutes Chapter 119.
Participants’ Confidentiality
The data for this study, including the information regarding the identity of an
individual, is already publicly accessible pursuant to Florida Statutes Chapter 119.
However, to avoid the risk of maintaining or disclosing personal information, all
identifiable data is excluded from the study. As such, maintaining the confidentiality or
obtaining informed consent is not an ethical concern for this study. IRB approval was
obtained for this study on November 18, 2021.
Generalizability of the Study
The generalizability of the study outcomes is based on the targeted population
group. If case findings are to be generalized to the entire population of the state, study
participants must preferably be gathered from various urban and rural centers throughout
the entire geographical area. This suggests that considerable variation is needed in the
strategies utilized to find participants. This study is limited to the State of Florida. As per
the United States Census Bureau (2019a), the population of Florida has been estimated to
be 21.48 million. The targeted population for the study is individuals subjected to the
Risk Protection Orders (RPO). According to Blocher and Charles (2020), Florida’s "Red
Flag" law has been enacted more than 3,500 times since its passing into practice in 2018.
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The state of Florida is comprised of a total of 67 counties. Out of these 67
counties, the top three most densely populated and three least densely populated counties
are selected as the sample for the proposed study. The most densely populated counties of
Florida include Pinellas, Broward, and Seminole. The three least densely populated
counties include Glades, Franklin, and Liberty. Across the Florida state, Pinellas County
has been positioned among the top four counties with a petition file for one out of every
2,000 residents (Spencer, 2020). Ultimately, only the three counties with the highest
population density were used in the sample because the counties with the least population
density recorded no petitions in the applicable time frame. The researcher expanded the
possible scope of the study to an additional ten counties with low population density:
Lafayette, Taylor, Dixie, Monroe, Gulf, Jefferson, Calhoun, Madison, Hamilton and
Levy. Although the State does not maintain full statistical data for 2018, the Office of the
Statewide Court Administrator identifies total petitions from 2018 to May 2021, and
likewise maintains data for the full 2019 calendar year.
In 2019, only two of the ten counties recorded risk protection petitions. Madison
County had three filings, and Levy County had one (1). In evaluating a 3-year time
frame, all counties recorded a total of four or less petitions with the exception of Monroe,
of which had 40 filings between 2020 and 2021, a timeframe outside of the scope of this
study. Thus, there was no feasible method of incorporating counties with lower
population density without applying random choice to the process. The study is therefore
limited to petitions filed in the three counties with the highest population density. This
limitation reduces the external validity of the study. Therefore, conclusions to the
population must be drawn with caution. Replication of the study from a statewide larger
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sample could confirm the findings from this study and provide more evidence for the
population at large.

Description of the Selected Counties
The six counties of Florida State are distinct from each other in terms of
demographics. This implies that a diverse sample will be selected for the proposed
research. Pinellas County is located in the central west coast region of Florida state.
Geographically, it is the neighboring county of Hillsborough County. It represents
approximately five percent of the total state population with a population size of 0.97
million approximately as of 2019. Even though Pinellas County is not considered to be
the most populous county of Florida, it is still the densest county with a resident density
ratio of 3.6 thousand people within a square mile. Females account for 52% of the total
population of the country and White is the highest prevalent race with a ratio of 82%. In
terms of education, around 30% of the county's population has graduated college with a
bachelor's level education, and 90% of the population is high school graduates. The
average household income is reported to be $54,090 and individual income is reported to
be $ 30,009 during the year 2019. The poverty level in the county has been estimated at
11%. It has been previously identified that Pinellas County is among the counties with
the highest ratio of petition files for its residents (United States Census Bureau, 2019b).
Therefore, Pinellas County is selected as one of the preferred counties for the research.
Broward County is positioned in the southeastern region of Florida and represents
approximately nine percent of the total state population with a total population of 1.9
million. It is considered to be positioned as the second densest county with approximately
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1600 individuals per square mile. The prevalence of the female population is 49% and the
prevalence of the White race is 63%. The average household income is reported to be
$59,547. The poverty level in the county has been estimated at 12%. In terms of
education level, around 32% of the county's population has graduated college with
bachelor's level education, and 90% of the population is high school graduates (United
States Census Bureau, 2019c).
Seminole County is located close to Orlando in the Central region of Florida and
represents 2.2% of the total State population with 0.47 million residents. The population
density is 1,525 individuals per square mile. The prevalence of the female population is
51% and 79% of the total population is White. In terms of education level, around 40% of
the county's population has graduated college with a bachelor's level education, and 94%
of the population is high school graduates. The average household income is reported to
be $66,768. The poverty level in the county has been estimated at 9% (Data USA,
2022a).
Liberty County is positioned close to Tallahassee in the panhandle region. It is
considered the least populated county of Florida with 8,772 residents and a population
density of 10.5 individuals per square mile. The prevalence of the female population is
38% and 77% of the population is White. In terms of education level, around 14% of the
county's population has graduated college with a bachelor's level education, and 81% of
the population is high school graduates. The average household income is reported to be
$38,015. The poverty level in the county has been estimated at 23% (United States
Census Bureau, 2019d).
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Glades County is situated in the south-central region of Florida and represents
0.1% of the State population with 13,121 residents and a population density of 16.3
people per square mile. Similar to Liberty County, Glades County also have a lower
prevalence of female population with a ratio of 34% females and a majority of the White
population with a ratio of 78%. In terms of education level, around 11% of the county's
population has graduated college with a bachelor's level education, and 75% of the
population is high school graduates. The average household income is reported to be
$40,977. The poverty level in the county has been estimated at 20% (United States
Census Bureau, 2019e).
Franklin County is located within the panhandle region and represents 0.1% of the
total population with 12,273 residents and a population density of 22.5 residents per
square mile. The prevalence of the female population is 33% and 83% of the total
population is White. In terms of education level, around 19% of the county's population
has graduated college with a bachelor's level education, and 80% of the population is
high school graduates. The average household income is reported to be $46,643. The
poverty level in the county has been estimated at 19%. The total population of these six
counties collectively is approximately 3.4 million, which constitutes 16% of the total
state population (Data USA, 2022b).
Instruments
Secondary data from publicly available datasets were used in this study. No
instrument was needed for data collection.
Research Design & Methodology
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This study used a non-experiment correlational design to evaluate existing
secondary data to determine the relationship between multiple nominal variables.
Because the study analyzes a pre-existing dataset, it is impossible to utilize an
experimental design (Swart et al., 2019). Moreover, the nature of the study relates, in
part, to homicide research, and it is neither possible nor ethical to randomize or create
control groups for homicide. Correlational non-experiment design is, thus, the
appropriate method to examine data from secondary sources (Creswell & Creswell, 2017;
Goertzen, 2017).
Research Variables
For Research Question #1, the dependent variable is acts of homicide associated
with firearms. The independent variable is the implementation of risk protection
legislation. For Research Question #2, the dependent variable is evidence involving
statements of mass attacks. The second research question is designed to evaluate the
characteristics of the respondents in comparison to known characteristics of mass
homicide offenders. Thus, the independent variables are selected from the factors
contained within the petition itself along with known characteristics of offenders. There
are 15 variables included in the petition, however, the 15th item is merely identified as
“other.” Thus, the researcher will include the 14 primary variables identified on the
petition as independent variables for this study. The 14 variables are as follows: (1)
recent act or threat of violence; (2) engaged in an act of violence; (3) mental illness; (4)
violation of a risk protection order; (5) prior subject of a risk protection order; (6) prior
conviction of domestic violence offense; (7) use or threatened use of weapons against
themselves or others; (8) unlawful or reckless display of a firearm; (9) used or threatened
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to use physical force against another; (10) arrested or convicted of crime of violence; (11)
substance abuse; (12) recent acquisition of firearms; (13) required to use firearms for
employment; and (14) subject to Baker Act proceedings. Additional variables are as
follows: (1) evidence of planned revenge; (2) evidence of precipitating factors involving
strain; (3) suicidal ideation; and (4) evidence of domestic violence. Data was limited, and
as such the researcher combined planning and revenge.
Data Collection Technique
The present study used publicly available data. The first research question seeks
to determine whether there has been a change in firearm-related homicides after the
March 2018 legislative implementation. Secondary data was obtained from the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement’s Uniform Crime Reports from 1999-2020 to determine
the statewide annual rates of firearm-related homicides and firearm-related suicides.
Likewise, for comparison, secondary data was obtained from the Florida Department of
Health, Bureau of Vital Statistics, on suicide prevalence during the time period in
question.
The second research question seeks to determine a relationship between the
issuance of a risk protection petition and known mass homicide offender typology
characteristics. The researcher gathered secondary data from the Office of the State Court
Administrator to analyze the state-wide prevalence of the risk protection petitions and
related orders. The researcher then accessed public records from online court docket
systems for Pinellas, Broward and Seminole Counties. Completing an application
(available for any member of the public) for “registered access” was required for each
county. Broward County required both “registered access” and “advanced” or “attorney”
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access to review the documents online. Once the researcher obtained registered access, a
search was conducted for every 30-day interval beginning March 2018 through March
2019 for probate case files. All risk protection petitions are classified as “probate” in
online court dockets. The online docket identifies the type of probate proceeding, and as
such, “Risk Protection Petitions” are labeled clearly and can be easily located in the
monthly docket searches. Every case file identified as a “Risk Protection Petition” was
then accessed and reviewed (see Appendix). The researcher viewed the physical petition,
available affidavits, and related orders. The researcher then documented the following
demographic data using Microsoft Excel: (1) case number; (2) date; (3) individual’s age;
(4) sex; and (5) race. Pinellas and Broward Counties both included the individuals’ ages.
However, Seminole County redacted any information pertaining to age. After
documenting demographic data, the researcher identified the presence of the nineteen
(19) variables used in support of the petition. The first fourteen (14) variables are present
on the face of each petition and are clearly identifiable by check marks. The remaining
five (5) variables involve more researcher discretion because the researcher obtained the
information from individual affidavits or police reports. To avoid bias the researcher
erred on the side of caution and only included the additional variables if the facts were
explicitly clear on the face of the documents. Microsoft Excel was used to organize and
maintain the data. The data were then analyzed.
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Figure 1
Outline of the Process for the Second Research Question
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Data Analysis
The quantitative data was gathered and statistically analyzed to address the
following research questions:
1. Is there a difference between rates of firearm-related homicide incidences
prior to, and after, the creation of Florida’s “Red Flag” law?
2. Do risk protection orders target individuals demonstrating known mass
homicide offender typology characteristics?
Data analysis were conducted using SPSS software. Research question #1 was
addressed first by conducting an independent t-test to compare the means between
groups. The researcher grouped the data into group 1 (years 1999-2017), and group 2
(years 2018-2020) to compare the means of the annual proportion of firearm-related
homicides and suicides. The researcher then used linear regression to conduct an OLS
interrupted time series test to determine whether there were any changes to the rates of
firearm-related homicides and/or suicides post-intervention. There is support in the
literature for using an interrupted time-series analysis to evaluate the effects of legislative
policies (Biglan et al., 2000). An interrupted time-series analysis is a valuable study
design that researchers and policymakers are increasingly using to assess the
effectiveness of an intervention (e.g., programs, policies, or educational interventions) by
comparing data points from before and after the intervention. The design compares
longitudinal trends before and after an intervention (i.e., the enactment of the "Red Flag"
law). While there are benefits to utilizing the interrupted time-series analysis, a complex
model cannot be used because there are limited data points after the intervention for this
study.
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Research question #2 involves both descriptive statistics and bivariate analysis.
The descriptive statistics show demographic and variable characteristics for all 556
analyzed petitions. Simple demographic statistics were created in Microsoft Excel to
demonstrate age, gender and race frequency. Likewise, Microsoft Excel was utilized to
demonstrate the overall frequency of each of the nineteen variables. The researcher
documented the variables in Microsoft Excel and identified all variables present for every
petition. The table included the following identifiers for each petition: (1) case
identification number; (2) petition filing date; (3) sex; (4) age; (5) race; (6) the fourteen
statutory variables; and (7) the five additional variables used for this study. Data for the
independent variables were measured at the nominal level. The dataset were then
imported into SPSS for statistical analysis.
To answer the second research question, it was necessary to compare the outcome
against the study variables to determine a statistically relevant relationship. The outcome
used for this study relates to statements of intent to commit mass homicide. Statements of
intent to commit mass homicide is not a statutory variable in the petitions. Thus, the
researcher evaluated associated witness affidavits and police reports to determine whether
witnesses reported that the individual threatened to commit mass homicide. The
researcher utilized the FBI’s definition of “mass homicide.” If the documents reflected
that the individual threatened to kill four or more people in one incident, the researcher
marked the variable as present.
A cross-table was first created to analyze the demographic variables, including
age, sex, race, and age group. Two of the three counties included age-related data.
Seminole County redacted age from public records. Thus, when evaluating age
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demographics, the total sample is reduced from 556 to 514. The same cross-table was
then used to demonstrate the overall frequency of the independent variables.
The researcher then conducted a bivariate analysis. A chi-square test was used to
conduct a 2x2 analysis to test the relationship between the outcome and all other
independent variables. Chi-squared is a non-parametric test to determine if two or more
nominal classifications are independent (McHugh, 2013). Fisher’s Exact Test was used
when necessary.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of the current study is to examine the effect of Florida’s Red Flag
Law. The following research questions guide the study:
1. Is there a difference between rates of firearm-related homicide incidences prior to,
and after, the creation of Florida’s “Red Flag” law?
2. Do risk protection orders target individuals demonstrating known mass homicide
offender typology characteristics?
Chapter Four presents the study results and is organized as follows: (1) Introduction, (2)
Demographic characteristics of the sample, (3) Analysis of research questions, and (4)
Summary.
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample
To answer the research questions, the researcher collected the following datasets
from publicly available reports:
•

Reports of firearm-related homicides and suicides from 1999 to 2020

•

Florida population from 1999 to 2020

•

List of individuals subjected to risk protection petitions from three separate Florida
counties (Pinellas, Broward, and Seminole) from March 2018 to March 2019.

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the population, firearm homicide cases, and suicide prevalence
in Florida from 1999 to 2020. The proportion of firearm-related homicide cases ranged
from 29.31 to 47.46 per 1,000,000 people. The proportion of firearm-related suicide cases
ranged from 65.19 to 89.49 per 1,000,000.
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Table 1
Firearm Homicide Prevalence in Florida from 1999 to 2020

Year

Population

Firearm
Homicides

1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020

15580244
15982824
16305100
16634256
16979706
17374824
17778156
18154475
18446768
18613905
18687425
18801332
18905070
19074434
19259543
19507369
19815183
20148654
20484142
20840568
21208589
21596068

460
499
502
552
586
555
521
740
825
780
694
669
691
722
695
690
767
874
790
836
853
1025

Proportion
of Firearm
Homicides*

Total
Homicides

Percent
Firearm
Total

29.52
31.22
30.79
33.18
34.51
31.94
29.31
40.76
44.72
41.90
37.14
35.58
36.55
37.85
36.09
35.37
38.71
43.38
38.57
40.11
40.22
47.46

856
890
867
906
924
946
881
1129
1202
1168
1017
987
985
1012
970
983
1040
1135
1056
1104
1120
1285

53.74%
56.07%
57.90%
60.93%
63.42%
58.67%
59.14%
65.54%
68.64%
66.78%
68.23%
67.78%
70.15%
71.34%
71.65%
70.19%
73.75%
77.00%
74.81%
75.72%
76.16%
79.77%

Note.* Cases per 1.000.000 people.
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Table 2
Suicide Prevalence in Florida from 1999 to 2020

Year

Population

Firearm
Suicides

1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020

15580244
15982824
16305100
16634256
16979706
17374824
17778156
18154475
18446768
18613905
18687425
18801332
18905070
19074434
19259543
19507369
19815183
20148654
20484142
20840568
21208589
21596068

1137
1203
1192
1202
1240
1192
1159
1225
1279
1397
1471
1448
1471
1532
1552
1514
1621
1667
1718
1865
1801
1726

Proportion
of Firearm
suicides*

Proportion of
non-FirearmRelated Suicides*

Total
Suicides

Percent
Firearm
Suicides

72,98
75,27
73,11
72,26
73,03
68,61
65,19
67,48
69,33
75,05
78,72
77,02
77,81
80,32
80,58
77,61
81,81
82,74
83,87
89,49
84,92
79,92

59,76
58,38
67,34
67,93
62,07
68,49
64,63
65,27
69,99
71,24
74,01
59,84
68,45
72,87
69,58
74,18
77,26
72,21
71,71
80,95
76,67
64,22

2068
2136
2290
2332
2294
2382
2308
2410
2570
2723
2854
2573
2765
2922
2892
2961
3152
3122
3187
3552
3427
3113

54,98%
56,32%
52,05%
51,54%
54,05%
50,04%
50,22%
50,83%
49,77%
51,30%
51,54%
52,60%
53,20%
52,43%
53,67%
51,13%
51,43%
53,40%
53,91%
52,51%
52,55%
55,44%

Note.* Cases per 1.000.000 people.
Information regarding individuals subjected to risk protection petitions was
collected from court records from Pinellas, Broward, and Seminole counties. A summary
of the demographic characteristics of the respondents is shown in Table 3. Although the
total sample involved 556 respondents, Seminole County redacted any reference to age,
and as such, data related to age involved a total of 513. The mean age was 39.8 (SD =
16.6). The median age was 37, with a minimum known age of 12 and a maximum of 89.
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The researcher grouped ages from 0 to 20 and in ten-year increments thereafter. The most
prevalent age group was 20 to 30, with 141 respondents or 25.4%. The remaining age
categories were dispersed in a relatively even manner, as shown in Table 3. Men
represented the vast majority of the sample at 483 or 86.9%. The majority of respondents
were White (N = 407), representing 73.2% of the sample. There were 97 Black
respondents at 17.4%, 34 Hispanics at 6.1%, and 3 Asians at 0.5%. The race was either
not defined or missing in 15 petitions.
Table 3
Demographic Characteristics of Risk Protection Respondents (Total Subjects = 556)
Demographic Variable

Total

Percentage

Age
Mean (SD)
Median [Min, Max]
Missing

39.8 (16.6)
37.0 [12.0, 89.0]
43

7.7%

Sex
Female
Male

73
483

13.1%
86.9%

Race
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Unknown
White
Missing

3
97
34
10
407
5

0.5%
17.4%
6.1%
1.8%
73.2%
0.9%

Age Group
0-20
20-30
30-40
40-50
50-60
60Missing

51
141
102
73
72
74
43

9.2%
25.4%
18.3%
13.1%
12.9%
13.3%
7.7%
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In addition to demographic characteristics, there are 14 primary variables
identified on the petition: (1) recent act or threat of violence, (2) engaged in an act of
violence, (3) mental illness, (4) violation of a risk protection order, (5) prior subject of a
risk protection order, (6) prior conviction of domestic violence offense, (7) use or
threatened use of weapons against themselves or others, (8) unlawful or reckless display
of a firearm, (9) used or threatened to use physical force against another, (10) arrested or
convicted of crime of violence, (11) substance abuse, (12) recent acquisition of firearms,
(13) required to use firearms for employment, and (14) subject to Baker Act proceedings.
Since we also wanted to examine known mass homicide offender characteristics, the
following variables were added: (1) statements involving intent to commit a mass attack;
(2) evidence of planned revenge; (3) evidence of precipitating factors involving strain; (4)
suicidal ideation; and (5) evidence of domestic violence. These additional variables were
generated by reviewing the physical petition, available affidavits, and related orders.
Descriptive analysis of the independent variables is provided in Table 4.
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Table 4
Descriptive Analysis of Risk Protection Independent Variables

N

Pinellas
n
%
4
2%

County
Broward
n
%
32
12%

Seminole
n
%
1
2%

n
37

%
6.7

Y

241

98%

237

82%

41

98%

519

93.3

N

8

3%

95

35%

2

4%

106

19.1

Y

237

98%

174

65%

40

96%

450

80.9

Mental Illness

N
Y

99
146

40%
60%

102
167

38%
62%

19
23

45%
55%

220
336

39.6
60.4

Violation of RPO or
no contact order

N

239

90%

259

96%

0

.00

540

97.1

Y

6

2%

10

4%

0

.00

16

2.9

Prior subject of RPO

N
Y

0
0

.00
.00

267
2

99%
1%

0
0

.00
.00

554
2

99.6
0.4

Prior conviction of
domestic violence

N

234

96%

254

94%

41

98%

529

95.1

Y

11

4%

15

6%

1

1%

27

4.9

N

23

9%

69

26%

3

7%

96

17.3

Y

222

90%

200

74%

39

93%

460

82.7

N

115

47%

184

68%

31

74%

330

59.4

Y

130

53%

85

22%

11

26%

226

40.6

N

177

72%

229

85%

27

64%

433

77.9

Y

68

28%

40

15%

15

36%

123

22.1

Involved in recent
act or threat of
violence against self
or others
Engaged in act of
violence over the
last 12 months

Use or threatened
use of weapons
Unlawful or reckless
display of a firearm
Used or threatened
to use physical force
against another on a
recurring basis

Total
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N

Pinellas
n
%
181
74%

County
Broward
n
%
179
67%

n
27

Seminole
%
64%

n
387

%
69.6

Y

64

26%

90

23%

15

36%

169

30.4

Substance abuse

N
Y

133
112

54%
46%

190
79

71%
29%

30
12

71%
29%

353
203

63.5
36.5

Recent acquisition
of firearms

N

195

80%

240

89%

39

93%

474

85.3

Y

50

20%

29

11%

3

7%

82

14.7

N

0

.00

267

99%

0

.00

554

99.6

Y

0

.00

2

1%

0

.00

2

0.4

Baker Act

N
Y

177
68

72%
28%

121
148

45%
55%

14
28

33%
67%

313
243

56.3
43.7

Suicidal ideation*

N
Y

134
111

55%
45%

162
107

60%
40%

19
23

45%
55%

315
241

56.7
43.3

Evidence of planned
revenge*

N

243

99%

265

99%

0

.00

550

98.9

Y

2

1%

4

1%

0

.00

6

1.1

N

215

88%

232

86%

33

79%

480

86.3

Y

30

12%

37

14%

9

21%

76

13.7

N

234

96%

260

97%

37

88%

531

95.5

Y

11

4%

9

3%

5

12%

25

4.5

N
Y

169
76

69%
31%

221
48

82%
18%

31
11

74%
26%

421
135

75.7
24.3

Arrested or
convicted of a crime
of violence

Required use of
firearms for
employment

Statements
involving mass
attacks*
Precipitating factors
involving strain*
Domestic Violence*

Total

Note. * Variables are not included in the petition as statutory factors. Researcher added
the variables for the study.
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As demonstrated in Table 4, the most prevalent variables are the following: (1)
involvement in a recent threat or act of violence towards oneself or others, (2) engaged in
a violent act during the preceding 12 months, (3) mental illness and (4) the use of
weapons in a threatening manner. A total of 519 respondents of the 556 sample were
alleged to have been involved in a recent threat or act of violence, constituting 93.3% of
the sample. There were 450 respondents engaged in an act of violence during the
preceding 12 months, constituting 80.9% of the sample. Those with mental illness
represented 60.4% of the sample, with 336 respondents. Finally, there were 460
respondents alleged to have used weapons in a threatening manner, constituting 82.7% of
the sample. None of the remaining variables include more than 50% of the sample,
ranging from 0.4% (prior subject of a risk protection order) to 43.7% (subject to Baker
Act proceedings).
Analysis of Research Questions
Research Question 1: Is there a difference between rates of firearm-related homicide
incidences prior to and after the creation of Florida’s “Red Flag” law?
The researcher compiled data on firearm-related homicides and suicides from
1999 to 2020 (see Tables 1 and 2). To account for population changes, data for the study
were aggregated from annual population statistics. A (n/population)* 1,000,000 formula
was used to calculate the population proportion for homicide and suicide cases, where n
is the number of cases in a specific year, and population is the total population for the
corresponding year. There were 22 data points from 1999 to 2020, 19 pre-intervention
and three post-intervention. The researcher used IBM SPSS version 28 to perform the
data analysis.
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Two statistical analyses were conducted to answer the research question: an
independent t-test and an interrupted time analysis with OLS regression. The independent
t-test compared the mean proportion of firearm-related homicides prior to and after
legislation. The interrupted time analysis was used to evaluate the impact of the red flag
enaction on the proportion of firearm-related homicides and suicides in Florida from
1999 - to 2020. The legislation was implemented, in part, to remove firearms from
individuals perceived to be a threat to themselves or others. As such, the researcher
hypothesized that there were changes in firearm-related homicide and suicide cases after
intervention (i.e., the enactment of Florida red flag legislation).
Independent t-test analysis. The researcher compared the proportion of firearmrelated homicides from the years 1999-2017 as group 1 (M = 36.16, SD = 4.5) to the
years 2018-2020 as group 2 (M = 42.60, SD = 4.2). The difference between Group 1 and
2 was statistically significant, t(20) = -2.30, p = 0.16, 95%CI [-12.27, -.60] (see Table 5).
The results indicated a significant increase in firearm-related homicides in 2018-2020
compared to 1999-2017.
For comparison, the same analysis was then conducted on the proportion of
firearm-related suicides in Groups 1 (M = 75.4, SD = 5.3) and 2 (M = 84.76, SD = 4.7).
There was a statistically significant difference in firearm-related suicides between Group
2 and Group, t(20) = -2.84, p = .010, 95%CI [-16.25, -2.48]. The results indicated a
significant increase in firearm-related suicides in 2018-2020 compared to 1999-2017.
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Table 5
Independent T-Test Analysis Firearm-Related Homicides

Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
F
prop_

Equal variances

firearm

assumed

Sig.
.049

.828

Equal variances

t-test for Equality of Means
t

df

Sig. (2-

Mean

Std. Error

tailed)

Difference

Difference

95% CI
Lower

Upper

-2.30

20

.032

-6.43558

2.79882

-12.27

-.60

-2.43

2.789

.100

-6.43558

2.64535

-15.23

2.35

not assumed

Table 6
Independent t-Test Analysis for Firearm-Related Suicides
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
F
Prop_Fire_

Equal variances

suicide

assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

Sig.
.423

.523

t-test for Equality of Means
t

df

Sig. (2-

Mean

Std. Error

tailed)

Difference

Difference

95% CI
Lower

Upper

-2.84

20

.010

-9.36777

3.30032

-16.25

-2.48

-3.10

2.861

.057

-9.36777

3.02468

-19.26

.528
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The trends in firearm-related homicides and suicides can be seen in Figures 2 and 3.
Figure 2 shows that the proportion of firearm-related homicides increased beginning in
2018. Interestingly, the proportion of firearm-related suicides drastically decreased
beginning in 2018 (Figure 3). The researcher graphed non-firearm-related suicide rates
for further comparison, as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 2
Annual trend in firearm-related homicides from 1999 to 2020

Figure 3
Annual trend in firearm-related suicides from 1999 to 2020
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Figure 4
Annual trend in non-firearm-related suicides from 1999 to 2020

Linear Regression
The preliminary analysis involved a standard OLS regression using three dummy
predictor variables (i.e., time, law, and trend). For l intervention at time t, the expected
outcome for the analysis can be seen in (1). From the Equation, β0 is the intercept, while ε
lt

is an error term. Β1.time models the data points in our data set and informs us of the

existing trend. Β2.law represents the intervention (i.e., the enactment of Florida red flag
law) and informs us of the impact of the intervention. Data for law was coded with 0 for
before the intervention and 1 for after the intervention. Lastly, Β3.trend informs us of the
change in trend after the intervention. Results of the OLS regression and the subsequent
interrupted time series analysis are presented in the following subsections.
Outcome lt = β0 + β1.time t + β2.law l + β3.trend lt + ε lt

(1)

Firearm-Related Homicides. The OLS model from the preliminary analysis
using the proportion of firearm-related homicide cases as the dependent variable showed
a statistically significant model, p = .003, adj.R2 = 47.7%, F(3,18) = 6.889. The
coefficients from the preliminary analysis are found in Table 7. SPSS selected ARIMA
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model 0, 1, 0, indicating no autoregression (AR) nor moving average (MA) parameters in
the model. This is also confirmed by a visual inspection of the residual ACF and Residual
PACF plots, which showed no residual autocorrelation in the series (see Figure 5).
Therefore, no correction for autocorrelation needed.
Table 7
Coefficients of Standard OLS Regression Firearm-Related Homicides
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Model
1 (Constant)
Time
Law
Trend

Standardized
Coefficients

B

Std. Error

31.207

1.740

.496

.153

-5.373
3.179

t

Sig.

Beta

95,0% Confidence
Interval for B
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

17.936

.000

27.552

34.863

.651

3.248

.004

.175

.816

5.793

-.382

-.928

.366

-17.543

6.797

2.581

.493

1.232

.234

-2.243

8.600

Note. Dependent Variable: Proportion of firearm-related homicide cases.
Figure 5
Residual ACF and Residual PACF Plots for Proportion of Firearm-Related Homicide
Cases

The interrupted time series analysis showed a statistically significant increase in
the proportion of homicide cases after the enactment of the Florida red flag law, p = .003,
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adj.R2 = 47.7%, F(3,18) = 6.889. Equation (2) shows the final formula to predict the
proportion of homicide cases in Florida. Figure 6 shows the final plot of the model.
Outcome lt = 31.207 + .496.time t – 5.373.law l + 3.179.trend lt + ε lt

(2)

Figure 6
Effect of Florida Red Flag Law on the Proportion of Homicide Cases

Firearm-Related Suicides. The OLS model from the preliminary analysis using
the proportion of firearm-related suicide cases as the dependent variable showed a
statistically significant model, p < .001, adj.R2 = 65.3%, F(3,18) = 14.169. The
coefficients from the preliminary analysis are shown in Table 8. When checking for
autocorrelation, SPSS suggested ARIMA model 0, 1, 0, indicating no autoregression
(AR) nor moving average (MA) parameters in the model, which is also confirmed by a
visual inspection of the residual ACF and Residual PACF plots, which showed no
residual autocorrelation in the series (see Figure 7).
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Table 8
Coefficients of Standard OLS Regression Firearm-Related Suicides
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Model
1 (Constant)
Time
Law
Trend

Standardized
Coefficients

B

Std. Error

Beta

68.361
.705
12.592
-5.488

1.728
.152
5.752
2.562

.745
.720
-.686

t

39.571
4.651
2.189
-2.142

Sig.

.000
.000
.042
.046

95,0% Confidence
Interval for B
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
64.732
.386
.508
-10.872

71.991
1.023
24.676
-.105

Note. Dependent Variable: Proportion of firearm-related suicide cases.
Figure 7
Residual ACF and Residual PACF Plots for Proportion of Firearm-Related Suicide
Cases

The interrupted time series analysis showed a statistically significant decrease in
the proportion of suicide cases after the enactment of the Florida red flag law, p < .001,
adj.R2 = 65.3%, F(3,18) = 14.169. Equation (3) shows the final formula to predict the
proportion of suicide cases in Florida. Figure 8 shows the final plot of the model.
Outcome lt = 68.361+ .705.time t + 12.592.law l - 5.488.trend lt + ε lt

(3)
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Figure 8
Effect of Florida Red Flag Law on the Proportion of Suicide Cases

Research Question 2: Do Risk Protection Orders Target Individuals Demonstrating
Known Mass Homicide Offender Typology Characteristics?
To answer this research question, the researcher used the variable, statements
involving planned mass attacks, as the output and then conducted a series of 2x2
association tests in SPSS 28 to determine whether there is an association between the
remaining 18 variables. Table 9 provides the descriptive analysis of the variables
specifically related to statements involving mass attacks.
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Table 9
Descriptive Analysis Using Statements Involving Planned Mass Attacks as the Output
Variable
Involved in recent act or threat of violence against self
or others
No
Yes
Engaged in an act of violence
No
Yes
Mental Illness
No
Yes
Violation of a prior Risk Protection Order or No
Contact order
No
Yes
Prior subject of a Risk Protection Order
No
Yes
Prior conviction of domestic violence
No
Yes
Use or threatened use of weapons
No
Yes
Unlawful or reckless display of a firearm
No
Yes
Used or threatened to use force against another on
recurring basis
No
Yes
Arrested or convicted of crime of violence
No
Yes
Substance abuse
No
Yes
Recent acquisition of firearms
No
Yes

No
(N=480)

Yes
(N=76)

35 (7.29%)
445 (92.7%)

2 (2.63%)
74 (97.4%)

94 (19.6%)
386 (80.4%)

12 (15.8%)
64 (94.2%)

192 (40%)
288 (60%)

28 (36.8%)
48 (63.2%)

465 (96.9%)
15 (3.13%)

75 (98.7%)
1 (1.32%)

478 (99.6%)
2 (0.417%)

76 (100%)
0 (0%)

457 (95.2%)
23 (4.79%)

72 (94.7%)
4 (5.26%)

88 (18.3%)
392 (81.7%)

8 (10.5%)
68 (89.5%)

272 (56.7%)
208 (43.3%)

58 (76.3%)
18 (23.7%)

378 (78.8%)
102 (21.3%)

55 (72.4%)
21 (27.6%)

338 (70.4%)
142 (29.6%)

40 (64.5%)
27 (35.5%)

299 (62.3%)
181 (37.7%)

54 (71.1%)
22 (28.9%)

405 (84.5%)
75 (15.6%)

69 (90.8%)
7 (9.21%)
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Variable
Required to use firearms for employment
No
Yes
Subject to Baker Act
No
Yes
Evidence of suicidal ideation
No
Yes
Evidence of planned revenge
No
Yes
Precipitating factors involving strain
No
Yes
Evidence of domestic violence
No
Yes

No
(N=480)

Yes
(N=76)

479 (99.8%)
1 (0.208%)

75 (98.7%)
1 (1.32%)

264 (55.0%)
216 (45.0%)

49 (64.5%)
27 (35.5%)

252 (52.5%)
216 (45.0%)

63 (82.9%)
13 (17.1%)

480 (100%)
0 (0%)

70 (92.1%)
6 (7.89%)

465 (96.9%)
15 (3.13%)

66 (86.8%)
10 (13.2%)

354 (73.8%)
126 (26.3%)

67 (88.2%)
9 (11.8%)

Table 9 demonstrates that the most common variables involving statements of mass
attacks are the following: (1) involvement in a recent threat of violence against oneself or
another (97.4%); (2) engaged in an act of violence during the preceding 12 months
(94.2%); (3) use or display of weapons in a threatening manner (89.5%); and (4) mental
illness (63.2%).
Statistical analysis was then conducted to confirm or reject any association
between the variables. Before running the analysis, the researcher checked for the
expected cell frequencies for each cell. A chi-square test for association was used when
all expected cell counts were larger than five. A Fisher’s exact test was selected
whenever this assumption was not met. Table 10 demonstrates whether chi-squared or
fisher’s exact test was used, the chi-squared results, phi value and significance level for
each of the 18 variables. Five of the 18 variables proved to be statistically significant
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when compared to the output: (1) unlawful or reckless display of a firearm, (2) suicidal
ideation, (3) planned revenge, (4) precipitating factors involving strain, and (5) evidence
of domestic violence. The results are summarized below.
Table 10
Summary of Results for Independent Variables When Compared to the Output
Variable

Chi-Square /
Fisher’s Exact test

p

φ

Recent act or threat of violence
against self or others

Fisher’s Exact test

.293

Engaged in an act of violence

χ2(1) = .212

.645

Mental illness

χ2(1) = .217

.641

Violation of RPO

Fisher’s Exact test

.706

Subject to a prior RPO

Fisher’s Exact test

1.000

Prior conviction of domestic
violence

Fisher’s Exact test

.770

Use or threatened use of weapons

χ2(1) = 3.771

.052

Unlawful or reckless display of a
firearm

χ2(1) = 8.895

.003

Used or threatened to use physical
force against another on a recurring
basis

χ2(1) = 2.312

.128

Arrested or convicted of a crime of
violence

χ2(1) = 1.563

.211

Substance abuse

χ2(1) = 2.235

.135

Firearms required for employment

Fisher’s Exact test

.137

Baker Act

χ2(1) = 2.585

.108

Suicidal Ideation

χ2(1) = 24.683

<.001

-.211

Planned revenge

Fisher’s Exact test

<.001

.262

Precipitating factors involving
strain

Fisher’s Exact test

<.001

.166

Evidence of domestic violence

χ2(1) = 7.408

.006

-.115

-.130
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Unlawful or Reckless Display of Firearms. A chi-square test for association was
conducted between the output and the remaining variables. All expected cell frequencies
were greater than five, and as such, the researcher used chi-squared to determine
association. The test showed a statistically significant association between the variables,
χ2(1) = 8.895, p =.003. The (see Tables 11 and 12). The association was weak and
negative, as indicated by φ = -.130, p = .003.
Table 11
Crosstabs Counts for Planned Mass Attacks V. Reckless Display of a Firearm
Unlawful or reckless display of a
firearm
no
Statements involving planned mass
attacks

no Count

Total

256

Expected
Count

267.6

yes Count

54

186.4

Count

18

454.0

216

29.6 216.0

454

Expected
Count

310

42.4 310.0

198

Expected
Count
Total

yes

72

526

72.0 526.0

Table 12
Chi-Square Analysis for Planned Mass Attacks V. Reckless Display of a Firearm
Value

df

Asymptotic
Significance (2-sided)

Pearson Chi-Square

8.895

1

.003

Continuity Correction

8.143

1

.004

Likelihood Ratio

9.378

1

.002

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association

8.878

N of Valid Cases

526

1

.003

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.003

.002
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Suicidal Ideation. All cell frequencies were above 5, and, as such, chi-square was
the appropriate test for the 2x2 association test. The results reflect χ2(1) = 24.683, p ≤
.001. The association was moderately negative, as indicated by φ = -.211, p ≤ .001. A
moderately strong negative correlation exists between the outcome and Suicide, as
indicated by φ = -.216, p < .001 (see Tables 13 and 14).
Table 13
Crosstabs Counts for Planned Mass Attacks V. Suicidal Ideation
Evidence of suicidal
ideation
no
Statements involving
planned mass attacks

no Count

Total

230

224

454

249.4

204.6

454.0

59

13

72

Expected Count

39.6

32.4

72.0

Count

289

237

526

289.0

237.0

526.0

Expected Count
yes Count

Total

yes

Expected Count

Table 14
Chi-Square Analysis Planned Mass Attacks V. Suicidal Ideation
Value

df

Asymptotic
Significance (2-sided)

Pearson Chi-Square

24.568

1

.000

Continuity Correction

23.320

1

.000

Likelihood Ratio

26.742

1

.000

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association

24.521

N of Valid Cases

526

1

.000

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.000

.000
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Planned Revenge. One of the cell frequencies was zero, and as such, Fisher’s
Exact Test was selected. The results showed a significant relationship between planned
mass attacks and planned revenge, p ≤ .001 (see Tables 15 and 16). The association is
moderately strong and positive, φ = .262.
Table 15
Crosstabs Counts for Planned Mass Attacks V. Planned Revenge
Evidence of planned revenge
no
Statements involving
planned mass attacks

no

Total

454

0

454

449.7

4.3

454.0

67

5

72

Expected Count

71.3

.7

72.0

Count

521

5

526

521.0

5.0

526.0

Expected Count
yes

Total

Count

yes

Count

Expected Count

Table 16
Chi-Square Analysis Planned Mass Attacks V. Planned Revenge
Value

df

Asymptotic
Significance (2-sided)

Pearson Chi-Square

31.830

1

.000

Continuity Correction

24.882

1

.000

Likelihood Ratio

20.194

1

.000

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association

31.770

N of Valid Cases

526

1

.000

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.000

.000
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Evidence of Precipitating Factors Involving Strain. Fisher’s Exact Test was
conducted because one of the cell values was less than 5. The results showed a significant
relationship between planned mass attacks and precipitating factors involving strain, p ≤
.001 (see Tables 17 and 18). The association is weak and positive, φ = .166.
Table 17
Crosstabs Counts for Planned Mass Attacks V. Precipitating Factors Involving Strain
Evidence of precipitating factors
involving strain
no
Statements involving
planned mass attacks

no

yes

Count

439

15

454

433.3

20.7

454.0

63

9

72

Expected Count

68.7

3.3

72.0

Count

502

24

526

502.0

24.0

526.0

Expected Count
yes

Count

Total

Total

Expected Count

Table 18
Chi-Square Analysis Planned Mass Attacks V. Precipitating Factors Involving Strain
Value

df

Asymptotic
Significance (2-sided)

Pearson Chi-Square

12.069

1

.001

Continuity Correction

10.049

1

.002

9.021

1

.003

Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association

12.046

N of Valid Cases

526

1

.001

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.002

.002
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Evidence of Domestic Violence. A chi-square test for association was conducted
between the variables. All expected cell frequencies were greater than five. The test
showed a statistically significant association between statements involving threats of
mass attacks and evidence of domestic violence, χ2(1) = 7.408, p =.006 (see Tables 19
and 20). It was a weak and negative association between the two variables, φ = -.115, p =
.006.
Table 19
Crosstabs Counts for Planned Mass Attacks V. Evidence of Domestic Violence
Evidence of Domestic Violence
no
Statements involving
planned mass attacks

no

yes

Count

333

121

454

341.8

112.2

454.0

63

9

72

Expected Count

54.2

17.8

72.0

Count

396

130

526

396.0

130.0

526.0

Expected Count
yes

Total

Total

Count

Expected Count

Table 20
Chi-Square Analysis Planned Mass Attacks V. Evidence of Domestic Violence
Value

df

Asymptotic
Significance (2-sided)

Pearson Chi-Square

6.689

1

.010

Continuity Correction

5.950

1

.015

Likelihood Ratio

7.575

1

.006

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association

6.676

N of Valid Cases

526

1

.010

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.008

.005
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Summary
In this chapter, the researcher presented the results of the statistical analyses.
When comparing means, the independent t-test established a statistically significant
increase in both firearm-related homicides and suicides from 2018-2020. However, the
interrupted time series analysis showed an increase in only homicides. The interrupted
time series revealed a statistically significant increase in the proportion of firearm-related
homicide cases after the enactment of the Florida red flag law. Conversely, the proportion
of suicide cases decreased significantly after intervention. The researcher then tested for
the associations between the 18 variables and the subjects’ history of having a statement
involving a planned mass attack. Of the 14 statutory variables, only one variable was
associated with the outcome, unlawful or reckless display of a firearm. The association
was negative and weak. Of the remaining variables added to the study by the researcher,
all variables were associated with the outcome. The outcome positively correlated with
two of the added variables: (1) evidence of planned revenge, and (2) evidence of
precipitating factors including strain. The association with planned revenge was
moderately strong. Strain had a weak association with the outcome. Suicidal ideation was
negatively and moderately associated. The fourth added variable, domestic violence,
proved to have a weak negative association with the outcome. Discussions of the findings
from the current study are presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
Mass homicide incidences remain statistically rare when compared to homicide
rates in general. However, media reporting tends to be sensationalized and sparks public
fear and outrage, of which in turn can result in a push toward implementation of
legislative action to prevent such occurrences. The outrage associated with the 2018
Parkland School shooting is precisely what caused the implementation of Florida’s 2018
Red Flag Law. There are now 19 states with similar forms of legislation, and despite
apparent widespread support, there is little empirical data evaluating the efficacy of the
gun control measure. Moreover, Florida’s 2018 legislation was designed, in part, as a
preventative measure against a particular type of violence - public mass shootings.
However, there is no known literature or data to suggest a relationship between such
types of legislation and mass homicide. This study was conducted to evaluate whether
there was a difference between firearm-related homicides prior to and after legislative
implementation, and whether the risk protection petitions targeted individuals displaying
mass homicide offender typology characteristics.
Identifying effective preventative measures related to mass homicide is critical to
policymakers. However, gun control measures taken in isolation are largely ineffective at
reducing overall firearm-related homicides. Here, the legislative intention was not to
impose a general gun control restriction; rather, to the contrary, the intention was to target
specific individuals with characteristics demonstrating an immediate threat of harm to
oneself or others. The question then must analyze whether the petitions are effective at
targeting possible mass homicide offenders. This study demonstrates that rates of
firearm-related homicide increased after legislative implementation and that the petitions,
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as used between 2018 and 2019, did not adequately identify individuals with known mass
homicide offender characteristics.
Results
Research Question 1: Is there a difference between rates of firearm-related homicide
incidences prior to, and after, the creation of Florida’s “Red Flag” law?
The researcher hypothesized that there would be a reduction in firearm-related
homicide incidences after implementation of Florida’s 2018 risk protection legislation.
However, established research clearly indicates that gun control measures, taken in
isolation, generally do not correlate with a reduction in firearm-related homicides. The
research is consistent with the findings here.
The researcher used two different tests to evaluate rates of firearm-related
homicides for the time frame in question. The first analysis involved a means comparison
with the independent t-test. The proportion of firearm-related homicides clearly increased
from 2018-2020 (M = 42.60, SD = 4.2) when compared to the mean from 1999-2017 (M
= 36.16, SD = 4.5). Likewise, the interrupted time series regression analysis reflects a
statistically significant increase in firearm-related homicides post-intervention p = .003,
adj.R2 = 47.7%, F(3,18) = 6.889.
Although the finding clearly indicates a statistically significant increase in
firearm-related homicides, this conclusion must be met with caution. There are limited
data points available to assess an overall trend post intervention. Moreover, although the
post-intervention group included three years, the researcher used 2018 in the postintervention category, however, the law first went into effect in March 2018. Further
study should be conducted from a longitudinal perspective to document trends.
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Figure 2 demonstrates a number of sharp decreases and increases in firearmrelated homicides during the relevant time frame. There was a significant drop in 2005
followed by a sharp rise between 2006 and 2007, another drop in 2009 at which point the
rates appeared to stabilize. Between 2015 and 2016 there was another sharp rise, of which
peaked in 2020. National rates of homicide showed a decrease in much of the 2000s,
however, there was a sharp increase in homicide rates nationwide in 2015, and this would
be consistent with the increase shown here (Rosenfeld & Wallman, 2019). There is no
existing data to explain the drastic increase in firearm-related homicides for 2020.
However, this was the year of the COVID-19 pandemic, and there is some research in its
infancy addressing crime trends specifically related to the pandemic time frame (Kim &
Phillips, 2021). Some early research has found that homicide rates increased in June 2020
and declined late summer and fall (Lopez & Rosenfeld, 2021). In addition, domestic
violence increased by 8.1% nationally after the issuance of stay-at home orders (Lopez &
Rosenfeld, 2021). Notably, the FBI reported a significant surge in gun sales from
February to March 2020, thus implying a substantial increase in firearm possession (Kim
& Phillips, 2021). An increase in firearm possession is correlated with gun-related
homicides (Kim & Phillips, 2021; Siegel et al., 2013).
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI , 2022) reports national homicide trends
in its Summary Reporting System (SRS). The reported statistical graph representing
national rates of homicide during the same time frame follows a similar pattern as
demonstrated in this study. The upward trend beginning between 2014 and 2015 to 2020,
as shown in Figure 9, is nearly identical to the trend shown in this study.
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Figure 9
Rate of Homicide Offenses by Population

Note. Reprinted from FBI Crime Data Explorer, FBI (2022, March 15). Retrieved from
https://crime-data-explorer.fr.cloud.gov/pages/explorer/crime/crime-trend
There are a number of confounding variables that could address homicide trends. The
similarity between Florida’s 2018-2020 homicide rates as compared to the nationwide
rates could reasonably infer that the increase shown here is not related to the
implementation of the Red Flag Law.
For comparison, the researcher added firearm-related suicides to the study.
Although the relative mean of firearm-related suicides increased post-intervention, the
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interrupted time series analysis demonstrated a statistically significant reduction in
firearm-related suicides. This finding is easily shown in Figure 3 demonstrating the
downward trajectory of firearm-related suicides post-intervention. The distinction
between the independent t-test and the interrupted time series could be related to the
sharp upward trend beginning several years earlier in 2015, the same point demonstrating
an increase in firearm-related homicides. The sharp rise in rates prior to intervention
would have increased the overall mean for the time frame in question. Although the study
clearly revealed a positive finding, this too should be met with caution. As discussed
above the available data is a significant limitation to this study. Further study is
recommended.
Research Question 2: Do risk protection orders target individuals demonstrating
known mass homicide offender typology characteristics?
The researcher conducted a series of 2x2 association tests to determine whether
there is a correlation between the 14 variables and the subjects’ history of having a
statement involving planned mass attacks. Chi-square is an appropriate test to determine
association between variables. However, the chi-square test for association requires all
expected cell counts to be greater than five. Fisher's exact test was selected in cases
where at least a cell has an expected cell count lower than five. A statistically significant
relationship was found between statements of mass attacks and five variables: (1)
unlawful or reckless display of a firearm; (2) evidence of suicidal ideation; (3) evidence
of planned revenge; (4) evidence of precipitating factors involving strain; and (5)
evidence of domestic violence. Phi (φ) was used to determine the strength of the
correlation.
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Unlawful or Reckless Display of a Firearm
A total of 454 respondents were identified as having unlawfully or recklessly
displayed firearms. A total of 76 respondents made statements involving mass attacks. Of
the 76 respondents, 18 (23.6%) were identified as having unlawfully or recklessly
displayed firearms. The results of the 2x2 chi-square test demonstrated a statistically
significant association between the variables χ2(1) = 8.895, p =.003. However, the
strength of the association is negative and weak, φ = -.130. This finding is consistent with
available literature detailing various offender typology characteristics. There is no known
support to positively correlate reckless display of a firearm with mass homicide typology.
Arguably, an unlawful or reckless display of a firearm could fall in the category
associated with impulsive behavior, of which would be contrary to mass homicide
typology.
Statements of Suicidal Ideation
A total of 241 respondents were identified as having suicidal ideation. Of the 76
respondents identified as having made statements involving mass homicide, 13 (17.1%)
also presented with suicidal ideation. The results of the 2x2 chi-square test demonstrated
a statistically significant association between the variables, χ2(1) = 24.683, p ≤ 001. Phi
(φ) score demonstrated a moderate negative association, φ = -.211. Some researchers
suggest that mass homicide offenders are suicidal, and that the mass homicide incident is
merely a means to an end; however, this research is largely speculative and focuses on
the offender’s behavior after the fact, and does not correlate with demonstrated evidence
of suicidal ideation prior to the event (Fridel, 2021; Frazier, 1975; Palermo, 1994).
Further study would be valuable to confirm the negative association between the
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variables. None of the statutorily required variables distinguish between self-harm and
harm to others. However, from a preventative public policy perspective, individuals at
risk of self-harm may require distinct services and may benefit from tailored wrap-around
programs.
Statements of Planned Revenge
Revenge is noted as a significant motivating factor for mass homicide offenders,
and, as such, the researcher hypothesized that revenge would be positively correlated
with statements of plans for mass attacks. The analysis supported the hypothesis. The
association is positive and moderately strong with a phi (φ) value of .262. The researcher
combined planning and evidence of revenge for this variable because of the limitation of
available data. Although only six out of the 76 petitions involving threats of mass attacks
expressly indicate a desire for revenge, the researcher urges caution in underestimating
the role of revenge. Revenge is not a statutory variable required in the petition, and
because of considerable discretion afforded to law enforcement regarding omitting or
including factual detail, it is not possible to confirm the prevalence of this variable. The
following case study demonstrates an example of a narrative expressly, including planned
revenge.
Case Study A
A middle-aged white man had apparently been struggling professionally for some
time. The narrative reflected that he had not been performing well, and he externalized
blame for his work-related problems onto his co-workers. As work-related problems
increased, the man’s externalized anger positively increased, and he was alleged to have
made a number of derogatory comments towards other employees, of which culminated
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in multiple threats of violence. The man had a fascination with firearms and would often
display photographs of his weapons to employees when he had become angered. After
experiencing a triggering event in the work-place, again related to his alleged job
performance, the man expressed that he would commit a mass shooting, and would target
those of whom he had perceived had wronged him.
Case Study B likewise involves employment-related problems, and associated
perceived anger. However, the narrative did not provide sufficient factual detail to
identify revenge as a motivator.
Case Study B
A middle-aged white man lost his employment nearly one year prior to the
application for the risk protection order. After suffering a precipitating event (loss of
employment) the man engaged in frequent behavior resulting in former employees
fearing for their safety. The man returned to his former employer on multiple occasions
to angrily confront employees, of which resulted in stalking injunctions. The man then
made frequent comments regarding his recently acquired firearm collection, and made
gestures towards others whereby he mimicked firing a gun. He contacted judicial officials
and indicated his willingness to commit a mass attack. Anecdotal evidence suggested that
he may suffer from PTSD.
It is unknown what caused the man’s employment separation, and it is also
unknown whether he suffered from chronic strain prior to experiencing the precipitating
events. Unlike Case Study A, where the narrative expressly indicated that the man sought
revenge against former employees the factual details in Case Study B provided only
inferences. Those facts would be helpful in identifying potential mass homicide offender
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characteristics. Despite the lack of factual detail, the case study establishes that the man
was, at a minimum, suffering from acute strain possibly triggered by the precipitating
event. The man expressed anger towards employees, of which could indicate his belief
that he was somehow wronged by others, thus leading to possible revenge. His recent
acquisition of firearms and associated fascination with weapons is likewise consistent
with the typology.
The researcher included revenge as a variable for Case Study A because the
narrative clearly identified the individual’s motivation. Although Case Study B could
certainly have been similarly motivated, there was no express language in the narrative to
make such assumption. Thus, revenge was not included. Notably, work or school strain
that occurs within the year prior to an attack constitutes common stressors for offenders
(Lankford & Silva, 2021). Researchers have found that 88% of school shooters and 97%
of workplace shooters had experienced work or school-related problems, and there was
often a precipitating event, such as being suspended, fired or disciplined prior to the
incident (Lankford, 2013; Lankford & Silva, 2021). Properly identifying this type of
motivating factor would be critical for not only identifying a possible offender but for
preventative measures to provide the individual with necessary services.
Evidence of Strain
The study results indicated a weak positive association, φ = .166, p=<.001,
between the two variables. This study combined evidence of strain with precipitating
events because of an inherent limitation regarding data exclusion/inclusion in the
petitions. Given the nature of the narratives included within the filed petitions, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to discern any distinction between an individual’s experience
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with strain versus a precipitating event. Out of the 76 respondents who made threats of
mass homicide, 10 respondents, (13.2%), were identified as having experienced
precipitating events and/or strain. The finding here is consistent with available literature
regarding the mass homicide offender’s experience with precipitating events and/or strain
prior to the incident. Although a stronger correlation between the variables would be
expected given existing literature, it is likely that the strength of the correlation shown
here is underestimated because of discretionary exclusion/inclusion of factual details
within the petitions.
Evidence of Domestic Violence
The study results indicated a weak negative association, χ2(1) = 7.408, p =.006, φ
= -.115, p = .006, between the two variables. The most common type of mass homicide
involves the family “annihilator,” and as such the researcher hypothesized that an
association would be positive. The finding here should be viewed with caution. The
researcher found 135, (24%), cases involving domestic violence, 9 of which made
statements of intent to commit mass homicide. The researcher only included statements
of intent to commit mass homicide if the records indicated that the individual intended to
kill 4 or more persons in the same incident. Thus, if the individual made a general threat
of domestic-related homicide, such fact would not satisfy the mass homicide requirement,
unless the documents clearly reflected the required number of persons. The available data
did not consistently identify the number of persons within the household. The limitation
of data could demonstrate an underestimation of the strength of the association between
the variables.
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Most Common Variables as a Default
From a percentage perspective, the most common variables associated with the
outcome in this study are the following: (1) involvement in a recent threat of violence
against oneself or another (97.4%); (2) engaged in an act of violence during the preceding
12 months (94.2%); (3) use or display of weapons in a threatening manner (89.5%); and
(4) mental illness (63.2%). These are the same variables most commonly found even
when not controlling for the outcome, as shown in Table 4. None of the variables are
statistically significant to the outcome. However, it is clear that the above variables are
the most utilized to obtain risk protection orders. The variables are vague and could
encompass a vast array of behaviors. As a result of the near 100% inclusion in the first
two variables, it is possible to suggest that the variables are selected as default. Moreover,
it would be impossible to determine whether the individual intended to threaten himself
or others from the language of the most common variables. From a public policy
perspective, it would certainly be valuable to determine whether the individual poses a
threat to others rather than oneself, particularly where the legislation was created to
minimize mass attacks.
Relying upon, what could be, default variables misses critical opportunities to
identify possible offenders. The following case studies demonstrate how the variables are
used when respondents allegedly made statements of mass homicide.
Case Study C
Law enforcement identified a white male juvenile as having made a threat of
violence and a threat involving the use of a weapon. The juvenile allegedly made specific
threats to commit a school shooting, and in doing so, emphasized prior attacks and
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explained how the planning could occur. He made similar statements on a social media
platform. The juvenile appeared to fantasize about prior school shooters. The narrative
did not identify whether the juvenile had particular targets. However, the juvenile made
generalized target statements and indicated that some people deserved to die. The
juvenile had experience with firearms and was alleged to have possession of weapons.
While there are general statements, the narrative did not provide factual detail to
identify the respondent’s possible motive, whether he suffered a strain, a precipitating
event, or whether he sought revenge on any particular person or group of individuals.
Likewise, although the narrative indicated that the individual could plan an attack, there
was no factual detail provided to indicate that the respondent did, in fact, engage in
planning. Thus, none of those variables were included in the dataset. On the contrary, the
only variables associated related to the threat of violence and the threat involving the use
of weapons.
Case Study D
Case study C is nearly identical to Study D. A white juvenile female made
statements in school indicating that she had a gun. The child had multiple writings and
drawings depicting previous mass shooters, and indicated a willingness to make a plan,
but there was no evidence that she did, in fact, conduct any planning. The child expressed
a desire to commit mass homicide, and made multiple drawings depicting graphic images
of murder. The narrative provided ample information in reference to possible criminality.
However, the narrative completely omitted any details to explain the child’s motive, her
experience with strain, precipitating events, and whether she sought revenge for any
legitimate or perceived reason.
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From a statistical analysis perspective, these cases demonstrate how the data
could be underestimated. There were 76 cases involving statements of planned attacks,
and although there is a statistically significant association with all of the researcher’s
included variables, the association is often weak. The majority of the 76 cases involved in
the output sample did not include specific evidence to identify the additional four
variables. Thus, there is limited data available to conduct association analysis. Notably,
most of the table cells related to the additional variables represent nearly de minimis
values ranging from 6 to 13 participants. Because the additional four variables are not
required on the face of the petition, and because law enforcement has significant
discretion in omitting or including factual detail, it is possible that the strength of the
associations found in this study are not accurately reflected. Further study would be
necessary to confirm findings.
There is a danger in treating the risk protection order as an exhaustive
preventative measure. Although some researchers suggest that risk protection orders may
constitute an effective preventative measure, firearm removal is only one of the
preventative components (Lankford & Silva, 2021). Removing a firearm does not
eliminate the underlying problem, and should not be viewed in isolation. Determining
whether the individual has suffered long term strain, a precipitating event, or whether
he/she believed they had reason to seek revenge, could trigger necessary threat
assessments and wrap around services as a more in-depth preventative measure. Utilizing
the risk protection measure may be an effective means to not only remove firearms, but to
identify possible offenders and to provide necessary services.
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Conclusion and Summary
This study examined Florida’s 2018 Red Flag Law to determine whether firearmrelated homicides differed after implementation, and whether the use of risk protection
petitions targeted individuals with possible mass homicide offender characteristics. The
study revealed that there was a statistically significant increase in firearm-related
homicides after implementation. However, the conclusion must be met with caution
because of very limited data, and because of confounding variables impacting homicide
trends. Suicide rates, on the other hand, decreased significantly post-implementation.
This is a positive finding, and suggests that the risk protection measure may be effective
at identifying at-risk individuals with suicidal ideation. However, this finding must also
be met with caution because of limited data. Additional longitudinal study is
recommended.
The researcher found 76 petitions involving express statements of planned mass
attacks. The study found that statements of mass attacks were associated with all four
researcher-selected variables identified as mass homicide offender characteristics. The
association, for the most part, was weak, however, the dataset available for the offender
characteristic variables was very limited. The limited data may be the result of
discretionary omissions in factual detail within the petitions and supporting affidavits.
This study only involved 556 petitions out of more than 3,000. There is considerable
variance between counties regarding the amount of factual detail provided within
affidavits and petitions. The findings cannot be generalized, and a more exhaustive study
is recommended.
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Risk protection laws are in their infancy, and there is little empirical data
available to evaluate efficacy. It is not surprising that risk protection laws are widely
supported by public opinion. Everyone can likely agree that it is good public policy to
remove firearms from individuals who pose an immediate threat of harm to themselves or
others. The question is not whether risk protection laws should be implemented; rather,
the question is how can risk protection laws be used in an effective preventative manner.
Failure to utilize the measure to identify possible offenders and provide them with
necessary services may render the measure nothing more than gun control. Dialogue
should occur to determine whether risk protection measures should be used not only as a
tool to remove firearms but also as a means to identify at-risk individuals and provide
necessary community services and/or threat assessment. Further research is necessary to
determine the degree of efficacy from a preventative perspective.
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Limitations
There were several limitations of the present study. The legislation is newly
implemented, and as such, there are limited data points to evaluate firearm-related trends.
In addition, limiting the data to only six out of 67 counties is anticipated to influence the
generalization of the study and indicates the necessity of further research. The researcher
attempted to control this limitation by including six counties representing the highest and
lowest population density. However, the three counties with the lowest population
density were excluded because no petitions were filed. Thus, further study will be
needed.
Confounding variables impact internal validity. A confounding variable refers to
the elements other than the studied variables and can pertain to both dependent and
independent variables. The primary confounding variable relates to the availability of
data obtained from the petitions and related documents. Significant variances occur
regarding the decision to include or exclude factual details. Because the decision is
entirely discretionary, it is impossible to determine whether facts pertinent to this study
were omitted. Notably, the outcome in this study was identified based upon information
that law enforcement elected to include in filed documents. Thus, it is impossible to
determine whether simple omissions or factual exaggerations influenced the outcome
data.
Finally, this study was conducted during the COVID-19 Pandemic, and it is
unknown how the community response to the Pandemic may have impacted firearmrelated homicides and crime in general. These are inherent limitations that cannot be
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controlled, and future longitudinal studies will be needed to evaluate the rate of firearmrelated homicides over a more extended period.
Implications of Findings and Recommendations for Future Research
The results of this study indicate the need for longitudinal analysis post-2019.
Evaluating the efficacy of the legislation in terms of firearm-related homicide rates
requires more data points. It is possible to hypothesize that the 2020 pandemic response
impacted the dramatic increase in firearm-related homicides. Likewise, unlike other states
that have implemented similar forms of legislation, there are more than 3,500 petitions
filed in the State of Florida, and a more exhaustive analysis of filed petitions would
provide additional analysis for generalization. It would inform regarding the need for
policy change. Finally, a comparison between Florida and states with similar legislation
is recommended.
Identifying high-risk individuals is the first critical stage in developing any
prevention strategy. This study demonstrates that risk protection petitions can be used to
identify possible mass homicide offenders, if sufficient factual information is included.
The results of this analysis suggest a number of possible recommendations related to
variables included within the petition.
1. Include a required variable identifying whether the respondent made statements
involving planned mass attacks. Mass attacks should be defined as any killing
involving four or more persons without a cooling-off period. There should not be a
distinction between public or private killings. However, because demographic factors
may vary depending upon the type of offender, a secondary variable should be
included to indicate whether the statement relates to a public or private attack.
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2. Include a required variable identifying whether the respondent has experienced a
triggering precipitating event. The petition should identify the type of event, if
known.
3. Include a required variable identifying whether the respondent experienced chronic
strain. Strain can be challenging to assess and could lead to an overuse of
discretionary inclusion or exclusion of factual details. Thus, it is recommended that
the petition include specific factors generally observed in individuals suffering from
chronic strain, such as bullying, social isolation, and the perception of oneself as a
failure.
3. Include a required variable identifying whether the respondent has made statements
or inferences regarding planned revenge. The petition should identify the target of the
revenge and the nature of the problem.
4. There is a strong correlation between domestic violence, mass homicide, and
homicide in general. The petitions currently identify prior convictions of domestic
violence. However, the face of the petition does not identify whether the nature of the
immediate problem is domestic-related. The face of the petition should identify
whether the nature of the problem is domestic.
5. This study did not evaluate any correlation with weapon fascination because the
petitions and related narratives do not include such data. Fascination with firearms is
widely accepted as a common characteristic associated with mass homicide offenders.
This researcher recommends a required variable to assess whether the respondent is
known to express fascination with firearms or military-style training.
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The inclusion of the above variables may assist in identifying individuals at risk for mass
homicide offenses and homicide in general.
Removing firearms from possible offenders is only one measure and is ordinarily
an insufficient preventative policy. Consistent with available literature, this researcher
recommends policymaker dialogue regarding the expansion of Florida’s legislation to
include the development of threat assessments, information-sharing, and community
wrap-around services for at-risk individuals subjected to risk protection orders. Wraparound services may include schools, the Department of Children and Families, mental
health facilities, human services, and healthcare agencies. In addition, incorporation of
educational training for a variety of entities such as law enforcement, educators, human
resource officials, and Department of Children of Families may provide individuals with
more tools to effectively identify characteristics that we recognize as “red flags.”
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